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RESPECT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
ANDREW E. TASLITZ*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A MERE TECHNICALITY
One question prompted this article: "Why do many minority
communities experience rage at certain police search and seizure practices
involving their communities' members?"' My apparently obvious answer:
because the police act in ways that make minority communities feel
disrespected. In reaching that answer, I came to recognize, however, that
members of the majority also often bear the brunt of disrespectful search
and seizure practices.2 Minorities and the majority may differ in when they
believe that "respect" has been shown. History, philosophy, and social
science converge in establishing that "respect" should nevertheless be at the
center of all Fourth Amendment reasoning.4 What "respect" is, how it is
conceived of by minority versus majority communities, and what
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I See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Century.
Privacy, Technology, and Human Emotion, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 134-45 (2002)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Twenty-First Century] (examining minority reactions to police invasions
of privacy); Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the
Internment, 70 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2257 (2002) [hereinafter Taslitz, Stories of Fourth
Amendment Disrespect] (discussing minority perceptions of, and reactions to, racial
profiling).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 95-141, 170 (illustrating potential impact on whites).
3 See Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note 1, at 158-69; Taslitz, Stories of Fourth
Amendment Disrespect, supra note I, at 2257-80.
4 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2257-91.
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psychological and social processes lead to its loss are, however, not so
obvious. Nor has it yet become clear to the United States Supreme Court
what role respect-based concerns should play in Fourth Amendment
analysis. 5 Those concerns have significant implications for every current
search and seizure doctrine. Understanding the Court's current approach
and its failures, and defending a respect-enhancing alternative, first requires
an analysis of the dominant "mere technicality" vision of the Fourth
Amendment.6 That vision seems at odds with the Amendment's sweeping
language:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
7
The right was of central importance to our Nation's Founders.8 It was
included in the Bill of Rights that the people demanded be added to the
1789 Constitution as the price for its ratification. 9 Images of King George's
troops violating "a man's castle" in search of contraband come readily to
mind.'0 The brave colonists' resistance to monarchy seems embodied in
this Amendment's lofty words."
Whatever noble ideals the Amendment's ringing language might
seemingly inspire, however, the amendment is in practice modernly seen by
many as a pointless annoyance. 12 Consider this scenario:
5 See infra text accompanying notes 95-105 (summarizing the high Court majority's
views).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 7-41 (defining the "mere technicality" vision).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8 See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 150-79 (1999); LEONARD W.
LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS, AND HISTORY 147-75
(1995); TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 38 (1969); THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 151-83 (Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991); see generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
9 See sources cited supra note 8.
10 See William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House Was Not His Castle:
Origins of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q.
371, 378-391 nn.38, 84 & 91 (1980).
1 See sources cited supra note 8; Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 10, at 378-91 nn.38, 84
&91.
12 See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("One hears the complaint, nowadays, that the Fourth Amendment has become
constitutional law for the guilty; that it benefits the career criminal (through the exclusionary
rule) often an( directly, but the ordinary citizen remotely if at all.").
[Vol. 94
2003] RESPECT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Two police officers, Cagney and Lacey, pay off a local stool pigeon for information
about a planned cocaine sale. The stoolie's information is vague, and he refuses to
reveal his sources. Nevertheless, based on this tip, Cagney and Lacey guess that a
cocaine sale will happen that night at a Water Street warehouse and set up a stakeout.
Unable to see much, they choose to break in. Inside, they find not only a massive
quantity of cocaine but a large shipment of illegal firearms ready to hit the street.
Their elation at a job well done is quickly ended when a judge suppresses the
evidence. Because the search was done without a warrant or probable cause, the trial
judge barred the jury from hearing or seeing anything about the drugs and weapons
confiscated by the detectives. Lacking evidence, the prosecution was forced to
withdraw the case, and another dangerous criminal walked free.
This image of left-wing judges allowing criminals to exploit the Fourth
Amendment and other legal technicalities has long been standard fare in
movies, television shows, and newspaper stories. 13 The media feeds the
impression of a massive, increasingly violent crime problem.1 4  That
problem is portrayed as exacerbated by the helpless system's flooding of
the streets with guilty men freed by wiley lawyers.' 5 Recent reports of a
declining crime problem have begun to combat the media-driven crime
hysteria. That decline is portrayed by the media, however, as caused by
new tough-on-crime measures to keep criminals behind bars, combined
with the appointment of stricter judges. 16  Political campaigns embrace
assaults on any judges who insist on enforcing a generous constitutional
vision.
17
13 See, e.g., Greg Wilson, Convicted Killer May Walk Free, Technicality is Key, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 18, 2001, at Al; see also NEW JACK CITY (Warner Bros. 1991); The
Sopranos: Funhouse (HBO Cable Television 1999).
14 See generally JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: How WE TALK ABOUT NEW CRIMES AND
NEW VICTIMS 28-47 (1999) (discussing how the news media brings new crime problems to
the public's attention); Sarah Escholz, The Media and Fear of Crime: A Survey of the
Research, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1997); Tracey L. McCain, The Interplay of
Editorial and Prosecutorial Discretion in the Perpetuation of Racism in the Criminal Justice
System, 25 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 601 (1992).
15 See sources cited supra note 14; RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
IMAGES AND REALITIES 45 (2d ed. 1998) ("In shows focused on law enforcement, the courts
are often alluded to as soft-on-crime, easy-on-criminals, due process-laden institutions that
release the obviously guilty and dangerous.").
16 On the reasons offered by the media for the declining crime rate, see Vincent F. Sacco,
Media Constructions of Crime, 539 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 141 (1995); see
also Jeffrey Toobin, Women in Black, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2000, at 48 (discussing
tough-on-crime Texas judges joining the bench during the tenure of then-Governor George
W. Bush); James Traub, Giuliani's New York, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2001, (Magazine), at 62
(describing the crime-reducing stop-and-frisk tactics of the NYPD).
17 For an example of a political assault on a judge for enforcing constitutional due
process, see Clarence Page, Ashcroft in Peril ... or Due for a Grilling, WASH. TIMES, Jan.
12, 2001, at A15.
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Amazingly, despite the media onslaught, a large majority of the public,
according to at least one study, opposes the admission of illegally obtained
evidence. 8 Yet many members of the public are swayed by the reduction
of a core constitutional right-namely, freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures-to a mere annoyance obstructing justice. 9  Perhaps more
importantly, the decision makers and policy advisors who decide when and
how searches and seizures shall be done reduce the Fourth Amendment to a
mere technicality. 20 "The criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered" is the rallying cry. 21 Academics insist that finding the truth is
what trials are all about, and the Fourth Amendment must not undermine
that goal. 2 Of course, some of these pundits pay tribute to the value of the
Amendment, objecting only to the remedy of suppression. 23 They propose
alternative remedies, however, that have either proven fruitless in the past
or that are obviously politically dead-on-arrival.2 4 Furthermore, they pay
tribute fleetingly, in small amounts, their tone emphasizing the social
18 On the public's surprising support for the "suppression remedy," which excludes from
the jury's hearing testimony about evidence illegally seized, see SHMUEL LOCK, CRIME,
PUBLIC OPINION, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE TOLERANT PUBLIC 45-47 (1999).
'9 See generally Arthur G. LeFrancois, On Exorcising the Exclusionary Demons: An
Essay on Rhetoric, Principle, and the Exclusionary Rule, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 49 (1984)
(discussing the ways in which academics, prosecutors, the public, and policemen are hostile
to the exclusionary rule).
20 See, e.g., Bill Renkin, Abuse Evidence Reinstated: Justices Back Cops' Search in
Terrell Case, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Mar. 3, 2001, at A: I.
21 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926); see also United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (suggesting that the exclusion of probative evidence may result in
some guilty defendants going free or receiving reduced sentences). Current arguments
against the suppression remedy and striking the "constable has blundered" theme are
summarized in H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED PROSECUTION OF
CRIME IN AMERICA 63-67 (1996).
22 The leading academic stressing the primacy of truth-finding under the Fourth
Amendment is Akhil Reed Amar. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 20, 28 (1997) [hereinafter AMAR, FIRST PRINCIPLES]
("The Court has ... concocted the awkward and embarrassing remedy of excluding reliable
evidence of criminal guilt .... Under the exclusionary rule, the more guilty you are, the
more you benefit.").
23 See, e.g., HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 32, 64 (1996) (stating that "truth must be a primary goal of criminal procedure and
[w]henever [the exclusionary rule] is applied, a criminal goes free"); Michael J. Daponde,
Comment, Discretion and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: A New Suppression
Doctrine Based on Judicial Integrity, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1293, 1297 (1999) (stating that
the current exclusionary remedy undervalues truth); Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of
Exclusion: A Price or a Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1276 n.6 (2000) (summarizing
concisely the leading literature in the debate over the exclusionary rule).
24 See Daponde, supra note 23, at 1313.
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calamity caused by the Amendment more than the social benefits it might
bring.25
The police embrace this same sort of skepticism about the
Amendment's value. Police often perjure themselves at hearings to
suppress evidence, a phenomenon so widespread that it has its own name:
"testilying." 26  They lie when they know that they have violated the
Amendment because they do not want to see the illegally obtained evidence
suppressed. Nor do they want to see the Department or themselves named
in a lawsuit or to be demoted because of a pattern of Fourth Amendment
suppression.27
And the officers know that judges usually feel the same way.28 Judges
routinely deny suppression motions when they know that the police are
lying.29 For example, the Fourth Amendment does not protect a defendant
who has abandoned his property. Therefore, officers repeatedly testify that
defendants suddenly and intentionally "drop" drugs while fleeing from the
police, in the suspects' purported hope that they cannot thus be linked to the
drugs.3 One judge explained: "[W]hen one stands back from the particular
case and looks at a series of cases ... [it] becomes apparent that policemen
are committing perjury in at least some ... [of these cases], and perhaps in
nearly all of them., 31 This judge admits that he nevertheless routinely
accepts an officer's dropsy testimony as truthful in a particular case. Judges
do so, he explains, because at some level they share the officers' attitude:
Policemen see themselves as fighting a two-front war-against criminals in the street
and against "liberal" rules of law in court. All's fair in this war, including the use of
25 See Richard A. Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal
Cases, 57 WASH. L. REv. 635, 638 (1982) (discussing how the excessive economic cost that
society pays for the suppression of evidence outweighs the social benefits of the rule).
26 On "testilying" and judicial complicity in this phenomenon, see ALAN M.
DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE 0. J. SIMPSON CASE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 49-68 (1996) thereinafter DERSHOWITZ, O.J.]; Christopher Slobogin, Reform: The
Police: Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037
(1996). [hereinafter Slobogin, Testilying].
27 See sources cited supra note 26.
28 See Alan M. Dershowitz, Controlling the Cops; Accomplices to Perjury, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 1994, at A17.
29 See id.
30 See Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias
and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. PITT. L. REv. 233, 249 (1998)
(discussing commonplace occurrence of dropsy testimony). For general background on the
concept of abandonment, see ANDREW E. TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 136,307 (2d ed., 2003).




perjury to subvert "liberal" rules of law that might free those who "ought" to be jailed
• . . It is a peculiarity of our legal system that the police have unique opportunities
(and unique temptations) to give false testimony. When the Supreme Court lays down
a rule to govern the conduct of the police, the rule does not enforce itself.
32
While police "testilying" may help to subvert Supreme Court rulings,
the Court too has generally accepted the view of the Fourth Amendment as
a mere technicality: "[a]fter all it is the defendant, not the constable, who
stands trial. 3 3  Most major decisions over the last three decades
increasingly stress the importance of the truth-finding function at trial.34
The Court subjects individual citizens' Fourth Amendment interests to a
"balancing" test in which the needs of law enforcement get ever-heavier
weight.35  Though there are important exceptions, and though the Court
occasionally praises the Amendment's value, the general trend is to narrow
the scope of Fourth Amendment rights and, even when such rights are
recognized, to narrow still further when the exclusionary remedy will be
available to enforce the Amendment.36
32 People v. McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 196 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1970) (quoting Irving
Younger, The Perjury Routine, THE NATION, May 1967, at 546); see also DERSHOWITZ, O.J.,
supra note 26, at 51 (interpreting then-Judge Younger as effectively admitting that he
accepted officers' dropsy testimony in many individual cases despite his awareness of the
perjury problem). Though Judge Younger's candid remarks were made three decades ago,
the problem of testilying persists. See generally id. at 49-68; Slobogin, Testilying, supra
note 26; MOLLEN COMM'N, THE CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE
ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PRACTICES OF THE POLICE
DEPARTMENT 36 (July 7, 1994) (coining the term "testilying"):
Officers also commit falsification to serve what they perceive to be 'legitimate' law enforcement
ends-and for ends that many honest and corrupt officers alike stubbornly defend as correct. In
their view, regardless of the legality of the arrest, the defendant is in fact guilty and ought to be
arrested.
Id.
33 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980).
34 See id. at 734-37; see also Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 364
(1998); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 137-38
(1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348 (1974).
35 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 169-77 (discussing the balancing test); David
A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the "New Federalism "
in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 367 (2001) ("[T]he new
conservative majority['s] . .. direction . . . [is] unquestionably away from the protection of
criminal defendants' rights and toward a more expansive view of police ... power.").
36 See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that officer's
reasonable good faith reliance on a search warrant later deemed invalid meant that the
illegally obtained evidence would not be suppressed); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996)
(holding that suspect need not be warned that his traffic stop is over and that he is free to
leave for his subsequent consent to search his trunk to be valid); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429 (1991) (holding that police may board bus and randomly request consent to search
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The burden of this narrowing vision of Fourth Amendment rights has
often fallen hardest on racial and ethnic minorities. 3 7 The Court purports to
endorse a colorblind search and seizure jurisprudence.3" Ignoring race,
however, is often precisely what promotes racial disparities.
39
To use the most obvious example, an officer who stops a car going one
mile over the speed limit has probable cause to believe that the law has been
violated. If the officer only stops those speeders who are African
American, or Hispanic American, or Asian American, that seems wrong. It
unsettles American notions of equal treatment.4° Yet if, as the Court
suggests, we cannot consider the officer's racial attitudes and assumptions,
or perhaps not even whether his conduct has a disparate racial impact, this
"racial profiling" is tolerated by the state.4 ' The Court's position on
profiling and the role of race in search and seizure decisions is a bit more
luggage without prior reasonable suspicion); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)
(approving no suppression given officer's reasonable good faith reliance on a statute later
deemed unconstitutional).
37 See generally DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 16-62 (1999).
38 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that police officer racial
animus is relevant only under the Fourteenth, not the Fourth, Amendment); United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (setting high burden for even obtaining discovery to prove
racial animus under the Fourteenth Amendment); see also David A. Harris, "Driving While
Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87
J. CRnM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997); Omar Saleem, The Age of Unreason: The Impact of
Reasonableness, Increased Police Force, and Colorblindness on Terry "Stop and Frisk", 50
OKLA. L. REV. 451 (1997); David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the
Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REv. 271.
39 On the Court's colorblind jurisprudence and its harm to minorities, see Neil Gotanda,
A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991); Dwight L.
Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless
Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979 (1993); Jerome McCristal Culp,
Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy Arguments
Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162 (1994); see generally COLE, supra
note 37 (putting forth extended defense of the argument that the Court's colorblind criminal
procedure jurisprudence in a wide-range of areas, including the Fourth Amendment, harms
minority, especially African American, interests while protecting white interests); ANDREW
KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992) (tracing evolution of the colorblind ideal in
constitutional law); TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 396-418 (examining colorblind ideal
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). See also sources cited supra note 30 and infra note 40
(examining how Fourth Amendment colorblind ideal promotes racial disparities).
40 See Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997);
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333 (1998) [hereinafter
Maclin, Fourth Amendment]; David A. Harris, Factors For Reasonable Suspicion: When
Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994).
41 See Davis, supra note 40, at 427; Harris, supra note 40, at 675; Maclin, Fourth
Amendment, supra note 40, at 337 n.22.
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complex and subtle than my claim here that they entirely ignore race. 42 But
the bottom line point would be unchanged by exploring those complexities:
a colorblind search and seizure jurisprudence often results in racial
injustice.
4 3
Racial minorities indeed have less trust in the police than do whites. 4
The level of trust is lowest among young African American males.45 Even
minority group members who may trust their local police are probably more
troubled by invasive police conduct than are many whites.46 Many minority
group members are attentive to, and especially worried by, police violence,
the stopping of young black males with little justification, or searches of
homes without warrants.47 Correspondingly, they worry that police offer
minorities inadequate and unequal protection from crime.4 Minority
communities yearn for a police force that promotes community safety while
valuing community rights. They agitate for a police force free from
conduct that insults and denigrates minority communities.49
42 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 421-25, 441-42, 443-45 (summarizing case
law).
43 See id. at 427-51 (explaining these subtleties).
44 See sources cited supra notes 38-39.
45 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the
Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 250 n.235 (2003)
[hereinafter Taslitz, Racial Auditors] (African Americans and Latinos generally); TOM R.
TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE
POLICE AND THE COURTS 146-47 (2002) (discussing how African Americans, especially if
young, are more dissatisfied with, and more unwilling to accept, police officer decisions than
are whites). Some of the raw data might be interpreted to show little significant difference in
racial attitudes toward the police. See, e.g., David P. Leonard, Different Worlds, Different
Realities, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 863, 870 (2001) ("Attitudes toward the police might also be
a measure of our different realities .... Several findings show little difference between
African Americans and whites."). There is, however, much contrary data and interesting
results when the intersection of race and other variables is examined. See Taslitz, Racial
Auditors, supra, at 250 n.235. Furthermore, minorities may sometimes be pleased with their
local police yet have less trust than whites in the police in general. See id.
46 See infra note 62; see generally JOHN L. BURRIS & CATHERINE WHITNEY, BLUE VS.
BLACK: LET'S END THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COPS AND MINORITIES (1999).
47 See generally BURIS, supra note 46; Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45, at 239-
58; TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 438-39.
48 See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 29-75 (1998); Taslitz,
Racial Auditors, supra note 45, at 239-48.
49 See generally Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45, at 239-48 (offering examples of
such agitation); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong: The Paradox
of Unwanted Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES
3-30 (1999) [hereinafter URGENT TIMES] (critiquing "Rights, 1960s Style" as ignoring the
modem need to protect inner city communities of color from violent crime).
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What is lost in the mere technicality vision of the Fourth Amendment,
therefore, is an appreciation for the ways that it affects the fate of
communities of identity."0 The Fourth Amendment protects core interests
essential to human flourishing, interests in privacy, property, and freedom
of movement. 51 Media images, police talk, and jurisprudence that address
primarily the costs of the amendment and only secondarily its benefits-
and that too narrowly define those benefits-miss the central point.5 2 The
image of the drug hustler manipulating the justice system to his own
advantage both misleads the public (drawing attention from police
wrongdoing) and ignores the many benefits that the Amendment bestows
upon the innocent. 3 Innocent people are stopped on the street every day,
54while rushing to work, walking to church, or heading for day care.
Property is seized-from cars, to cash, to homes-from the innocent.
55
Homes are invaded with little cause and perhaps no apology when no
evidence of wrongdoing is found.56 These invasions are psychologically
50 See generally Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45; Taslitz, Twenty-First Century,
supra note 1; Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1.
51 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 94-102; Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note
45; Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note I (reviewing scholarly literature on the privacy
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of
Locomotion. The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1258 (1990)
[hereinafter Maclin, Right to Locomotion] (similar concerning freedom of movement);
Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure, and the Positive Law. Expectations of Privacy Outside
the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249 (1993) (similar concerning
property).
52 See sources cited supra notes 15-40 (on media images and police talk); infra text
accompanying notes 211-47 (on narrow conceptions of costs and benefits).
53 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2293-94
(discussing the public uproar over initial trial court suppression of evidence in a drug case).
54 See, e.g., KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: WHAT TO DO IF YOU ARE A VICTIM
OF RACIAL PROFILING I 1-15 (2000) (telling the tale of an innocent man on his way home
from work detained by the police for apparently no reason); Jennifer R. Wyann, Can Zero
Tolerance Last?, in ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE NEW POLICE BRUTALITY IN
NEW YORK CITY 107, 114 (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 2001) (noting that of the
45,000 stops reported by the N.Y.P.D. Street Crimes Unit in 1997 and 1998, only 9500
resulted in arrests).
55 See, e.g., RICHARD LAWRENCE MILLER, DRUG WARRIORS AND THEIR PREY: FROM
POLICE POWER TO POLICE STATE 55, 93, 96-97, 100, 106, 108-12, 117-19, 132-34, 138-39
(1996) (recounting numerous instances of, and data concerning, state seizure of property of
the innocent).
56 See id. at 49 (describing a "drug squad's surreptitious illegal search of a room when
the occupant might return unannounced at any moment"); infra text accompanying notes 57-
58 (summarizing effect of the War on Drugs on the sanctity of the home).
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painful. They send a message to their victims that they are unworthy of the
government's respect:57
[S]hocking images of combat-ready officers battering their way into a private home
are routine in America's cities today thanks to the war on drugs, as well as the war on
illegal immigration. All across the country, the SWATification of policing has led to
a proliferation of special units trained to rely on aggressive tactics, barging into homes
and swooping down on citizens with impunity.
Unfortunately, there seems to be little public enthusiasm for this debate. That's
because few voters live in neighborhoods where gang units are likely to enter their
kids' names and photos into the department database merely for wearing their hats
backward. Nor do most of us lose sleep worrying whether the police might batter
down our doors by mistake in search of drugs.
5 8
Law professor David Cole goes further, seeing discriminatory and
unjustifiable police practices as encouraging distrust, anger, and even
criminality among those individuals affected. 9
But individuals' identity is often linked closely to those groups that
matter most to them.60 When an individual is wrongly stopped because of
his race, the sense of disrespect he feels may be felt by others in his racial
community. When many persons of a certain race are regularly so stopped,
the impact on the broader racial community is deeper.61  Minority
communities sense, in a way that the Court does not, that strong Fourth
Amendment protections are central to fostering respect for both individuals
62and their communities. At the same time, as grass roots activism and
57 See generally Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45; Taslitz, Stories of Fourth
Amendment Disrespect, supra note I.
58 Bonnie Bucqueroux, When Cops Become Combat Troops: The Controversial Use of
Force to Seize Elian Gonzales is Just Business as Usual in the War on Drugs, May 2, 2000,
at http://archive.salon.comnews/feature/2000/05/02/swat/ (written by the executive director
of Crime Victims for a Just Society and former Associate Director for the National Center
for Community Policing at Michigan State University for almost a decade); cf AMAR, FIRST
PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, at 20-31 (emphasizing, albeit perhaps too exclusively, the role of
the Fourth Amendment in protecting the innocent).
59 See COLE, supra note 37, at 5-13. See generally Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies, and
Interrogation, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 3 (1995) (discussing importance of state-citizen trust
in the law of constitutional criminal procedure).
60 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate
Crimes Legislation are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 749-53, 757-63 (1999) [hereinafter
Taslitz, Racist Personality].
61 See sources cited supra notes 40, 42, 45 (discussing racial profiling); Taslitz, Racial
Auditors, supra note 45 (regarding stereotyping and disrespect under the Fourth
Amendment).
62 See Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45, at 239-58 & nn.235, 241 (minority group
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perceptions of the importance of Fourth Amendment-like protections). I want to be precise
about my claims here. The data on the attitudes of various racial, ethnic, and class groups
toward search and seizure practices are still too scanty and are subject to varying
interpretations. Furthermore, at least one study suggests that African Americans and
Hispanics, especially those in lower-income brackets and with limited education, are more
willing than middle or upper income whites to support aggressive law enforcement, even
when it impinges on civil liberties. See, e.g., Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Civil Liberties and
Aggressive Enforcement: Balancing the Rights of Individuals and Society in the Drug War,
in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 203, 218-29 (David R. Karp ed., 1998). But
that study used survey questions that asked respondents what power the government should
have to evict, seize the property of, and round-up suspected drug dealers, without asking
specifically about situations where innocent persons suffer because of such practices. See id.
at 218-29. Nor did the study address attitudes toward specific police practices. Furthermore,
the study speculates that less educated and lower income individuals "probably had greater
exposure to aggressive police behavior, which may desensitize them to such actions." Id. at
221.
Even if the study is taken to mean that the majority of inner city minorities would
accept invasive policing, that may simply mean that, "in dire straits, and with limited
options, they will grasp at any rope, no matter how steep the price." Carol Steiker, More
Wrong Than Rights, in URGENT TIMES, supra note 49, at 49, 51. Moreover, these same
residents might, despite such desperation and contrary to the Rosenbaum study, be quite
aware of the ways in which police conduct may also insult individual residents and their
communities. For example, there are numerous studies suggesting that blacks are highly
dissatisfied with police behavior, especially as compared to Whites. See, e.g., Ronald
Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of Discrimination by the Police, 45
CRIME & DELINQ. 494, 498-99 (1999) [hereinafter Weitzer & Tuch, Race, Class, and
Perceptions] (finding that 65.8% of blacks in this study had only some, little, or no
confidence that their local police would treat blacks and whites equally; approximately five
times as many blacks as whites reported experiencing mistreatment at the hands of the
police; and a similar proportion believed that police racism was very common); Steven A.
Tuch & Ronald Weitzer, Racial Differences in Attitudes Toward the Police, 61 PUB. OPINION
Q. 642, 642 (1997) [hereinafter, Tuch & Weitzer, Racial Differences] ("African Americans
are more likely than whites to express unfavorable attitudes toward various aspects of
policing"); see also Richard R. Johnson, Citizen Complaints: What the Police Should Know,
67 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1, 5 (Dec. 1998) ("The research demonstrates that a
misunderstanding exists between the police and young males from lower socioeconomic
neighborhoods and also suggests a general lack of faith in the police by most ethnic minority
groups .. "). Even the study most favorable to the police-reporting that a majority of
blacks in twelve selected cities were satisfied with their local police-still reflected
significantly lower percentages of blacks than whites in ten of those cities expressing such
satisfaction, raising the question, why? See STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY IN 12 CITIES, 1998, at 25
(1999).
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that when affected minorities are more aware of
their rights, and of the community impact of particular police practices, minorities react with
a greater degree of outrage than do whites. See, e.g., Weitzer & Tuch, Race, Class, and
Perceptions, supra, at 494, 500 (finding that better educated blacks are more likely than less
educated Blacks to believe in widespread police racism, though this belief did not vary with
income); Tuch & Weitzer, Racial Differences, supra, at 646 (finding that blacks and, to a
somewhat lesser extent, Latinos, develop deeper and longer-lasting negative attitudes toward
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some community policing efforts have shown, respect-enhancing police
actions improve law enforcement effectiveness. Citizens more actively and
eagerly cooperate with a respectful police force. 63  The result is crime
reduction.64
the police than do whites after well-publicized police brutality incidents); cf. Rosenbaum,
supra, at 225 (finding that minorities in surveys are consistently more strongly opposed than
whites to police excessive use of force because of its highly visible nature). Additionally,
there is some evidence that even when blacks have some confidence in their experiences
with their local police, they may retain a greater skepticism than whites toward police
practices in general. Cf Tuch & Weitzer, Racial Differences, supra, at 646 (finding that
while highly educated blacks are more skeptical of police in general than less educated
blacks, both groups reveal a somewhat lower and relatively equal level of trust toward their
local police relative to whites).
Ample anecdotal evidence also suggests a different perspective among black and white
victims of invasive police conduct, especially based on the perception of racial
discrimination. See generally BURRIS, supra note 46 (collecting such anecdotes); MEEKS,
supra note 54 (similar). Group attitudes also change over time, and the longer view reveals
the full scope of a group's interaction with the police. Past, not just present, attitudes and
events thus matter. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 427-38 (importance of
examining racial group history). Furthermore, each minority group itself contains diverse
viewpoints. Whether the views of a minority among a nationwide majority should control or
even matter in crafting or applying a particular legal rule is a normative matter, but it is
better to be aware of those views than ignorant of them. See infra Part III.C.
No single conclusion as to any particular search and seizure doctrine can be drawn
from any of this data alone. Nor am I suggesting that more invasive police actions than are
now accepted should never be embraced, regardless of the circumstances. Perhaps that is
sometimes necessary. My major point is simply that it is important to listen to the diverse
views and experiences of those groups most vulnerable to the costs imposed by police
actions. We must listen and learn, from today and from yesterday. So informed, we are
better equipped to craft and apply the relevant principles of constitutional morality. As I will
shortly summarize, such listening aids in giving concrete shape to a respect-based
jurisprudence.
63 See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (1994); DAVID A.
HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 117-28 (2002)
(discussing the damage to minority group trust and willingness to cooperate with the police
and to the criminal justice system's perceived legitimacy more generally); David A. Harris,
Racial Profiling Now: "Just Common Sense," 17 CRIM. JUST. 36-41, 59 (2002) [hereinafter
Harris, Common Sense] (summarizing empirical data).
64 Professor David Cole makes many similar points regarding the impact of
discriminatory policing on racial and group trust in, and willingness to cooperate with, law
enforcement, albeit using different language than I use here. See COLE, supra note 37, at 3-
16, 52-54; see also Bucqueroux, supra note 58 (vigorously arguing for a certain sort of
community policing as the remedy for high crime rates and minority distrust of the police).
Cole argues, however, that whites benefit from this discrimination by, in practice, having
more expansive constitutional protection (because the police do not readily invade white
rights) than do minority communities. See COLE, supra note 37, at 5-13, 53-55. Although he
favors candor and equality, he speculates that achieving those goals would unleash political
pressures that would reduce the scope of constitutional protections for the accused. Id. at 9.
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"Respect" is in part about status or esteem. Each person feels
respected when he is treated as significant and of equal worth with every
other person.65 Groups too struggle for equal status.66
But respect is also about inclusion, about being considered full
67members of the wider political community. When African Americans in
Jim Crow America could not sit at white lunch counters, they felt excluded
from the American community. 68 Yet, what is rarely recognized is that Jim
Crow laws went to the heart of the Fourth Amendment by regulating where
certain citizens could choose to work, live, eat, and play.69 Similarly, today,
I do not want to over-sell community policing. Many commentators believe that the
successes of the movement are limited and that there is not even common agreement about
what defines a policing style as community-oriented. See, e.g., Michael E. Buerger, A Tale
of Two Targets: Limitations of Community Anticrime Actions, in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN
EMERGING FIELD, supra note 62, at 137, 137-42; Randolph M. Grinc, "Angels in Marble":
Problems in Stimulating Community Involvement in Community Policing, in COMMUNITY
JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD, supra note 62, at 167, 170-72. Among the reasons for this
disappointing performance, however, are inadequate police efforts to allay a long history of
community distrust of the police, see Grinc, supra, at 180-81; police failure adequately to
inform the community of its role, see id. at 186-89; community policing being perceived as
more a show than a reality, see, e.g., ELI B. SILVERMAN, NYPD BATTLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE
STRATEGIES IN POLICING 61-62 (1999); and inadequate widespread re-training of officers in
the empathetic, communicative, and problem-solving skills necessary to the new style of
policing. See, e.g., BURRIS, supra note 46, at 214-17; SUSAN L. MILLER, GENDER AND
COMMUNITY POLICING: WALKING THE TALK 193-227 (1999). In other words, a police failure
to show adequate commitment to, and respect for, the community they serve accounts for the
deficiencies in many current forms of purported "community" policing.
65 See, e.g., Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 60, at 756-66; ANDREW E. TASLITZ,
RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 134-51 (1999) [hereinafter TASLITZ, RAPE AND
CULTURE]; accord RICHARD L. ABEL, SPEAKING RESPECT, RESPECTING SPEECH 58-80 (1998);
KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION I -
15 (1989).
66 See, e.g., Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 60, at 756-66; TASLITZ, RAPE AND
CULTURE, supra note 65, at 134-51, accord ABEL, supra note 65, at 58-80; KARST, supra
note 65, at 1-15.
67 See Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note I, at 158-65; Taslitz, Racist Personality,
supra note 60; see generally Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note I
(collecting historical examples).
68 See Ella J. Baker, Bigger than a Hamburger, reprinted in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE
CIVIL RIGHTS READER: DOCUMENTS, SPEECHES, AND FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS FROM THE BLACK
FREEDOM STRUGGLE, 1954-1990 120, 120-21 (Clayborne Carson et al. eds., 1991).
69 AMAR, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 22.
[A] great many government actions can be properly understood as searches or seizures,
especially when we remember that a person's "effects" may be intangible.... Unlike the due
process clause, in whose name so much has been done, the Fourth Amendment clearly speaks to
substantive as well as procedural unfairness and openly proclaims a need to distinguish between
reasonable and unreasonable government policy. For those who believe in a "substantive due
process" approach to the Constitution, the Fourth Amendment thus seems a far more plausible
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when officers employ racial profiling to stop young African American
males walking down the street, the officers insult and degrade the young
men and their racial groups, making them feel less than full members of the
American polity.
70
Respect requires recognizing that group identity is at the core of
individual identity. The state must, therefore, embrace salient groups as
equal partners in creating and implementing criminal justice policy. Group
voices must be heard. But individuals must also be treated as unique,
judged for what they do rather than what group they belong to. There is
thus a healthy tension between group and individualized justice.71
Moreover, each citizen and his group must feel that the state intrudes upon
their freedoms only when there is ample and trustworthy evidence of
individual wrongdoing.72 Furthermore, all branches of government must
recognize their constitutional obligation to express respect for citizens while
enforcing the law. 73 As the testilying example illustrates, the courts cannot
alone do the job. They must rely on the executive branch of police,
prosecutors, state governors, the national President, and the political will of
state and federal legislators, to enforce constitutional mandates.
Nevertheless, the courts must continue to play their role of setting "a
constitutional floor protecting individuals and constraining government. 74
textual base than the due process clause itself. For those who believe in general rationality
review, the Fourth, here too, is more explicit than its current doctrinal alternative, the equal
protection clause.
Id. at 39-40. This article will try to illustrate some advantages of seeing certain issues as
Fourth, rather than only Fourteenth, Amendment problems. The blindness of civil rights
activists in not seeing the Fourth Amendment implications of Jim Crow may have stemmed
from the flawed popular association between the Fourth Amendment and criminality. See
supra and infra text accompanying notes 1-78.
70 See Lu-in Wang, Suitable Targets? Parallels and Connections Between "Hate"
Crimes and "Driving While Black", 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 209 (2001) (demonstrating similar
injuries and mechanisms for their infliction in both hate crimes and racial profiling).
71 See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 60, at 746-59; Andrew E. Taslitz, What
Feminism Has to Offer Evidence Law, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 171, 204-09 (1999).
72 See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 91-93 (1997)
(arguing that decision accuracy and trustworthiness of evidence are aspects of procedural
justice); Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1 (illustrating these
points).
73 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2283 nn. 162-63,
2342-54 (using history and political theory to make this point concerning the Fourth
Amendment); TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 65, at 148-51 (discussing more
general constitutional obligations of legislatures to champion equal protection and free
speech concerns); ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 41 (1994) (similar).
74 Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 787 (1999).
[Vol. 94
RESPECT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
That floor too often collapses under the weight of the mere technicality
vision.
I am not making a sharp analytical distinction here between "mere
technicalities" and "rules of substance." Rather, I am describing an attitude
whose strength may vary from one situation to another.75
Judges indeed likely understand-in a way that the lay public, the
police, and the media may not-that even technicalities serve purposes."
Filing deadlines, for example, discourage lawyer laziness, intentional delay,
and simple indifference :o client needs.77  But if a rule is even
subconsciously viewed as merely a technicality, the courts will far more
easily let it bend to countervailing concerns and will defer to other legal
actors' judgments about whether the rule has been met or requires an
exception. 78 To avoid that result in the area of search and seizure law, a
substantive vision of the Fourth Amendment's value to our republic must
replace the near-sighted view of mere technicalities. This article seeks to
articulate such a vision, one rooted in the substantive value of respect. My
major goals here are to define "respect," to explore an approach to
constitutional interpretation that gives respect concrete meaning in
75 On the importance to judicial decisionmaking of judge's attitudes-which are often
embodied in the sorts of stories their opinions tell, see ANTHONY AMSTERDAM & JEROME
BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000).
76 See J. Thomas Greene, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 40 JUDGES J. 22, 22-24 (2001) (arguing that public's perception that criminals go
free on technicalities partly reflects courts' failure to explain to laypersons the value of such
rules).
77 A deadline set by legal rules is, again, not definitionally a mere technicality. Juridical
attitude is what matters. If, as I observed to be true in criminal court practice in
Philadelphia, courts readily excuse lateness in filing motions on the feeblest of lawyer
excuses, especially in important cases, the filing deadlines become mere technicalities easily
outweighed by other interests, with deference paid to the judgments of the affected parties
(the lawyers). Yet the United States Supreme Court has imposed a much shorter deadline of
forty-eight hours for an arrestee to receive a probable cause hearing. See County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). Although perhaps even this delay is too long,
the Court's attitude toward this presumptive deadline is more substantive than technical
(something fairly unusual for this Court). If the deadline passes, the state has the burden of
demonstrating the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance.
See id. at 57. Even a hearing done within the deadline may, moreover, be invalid upon a
showing by the suspect of unreasonable delay. See id. at 56.
78 See, e.g., ROGER C. PARK ET AL., EVIDENCE LAW 542-43 (1998) (arguing that if a
reviewing court finds that an evidentiary error was harmless-not significantly affecting the
outcome of a case-the error will not justify reversal); David P. Leonard, Appellate Review
of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1155, 1228-29 (1992) (arguing that an absence of




individual cases, and to illustrate the ways in which a respect-full
jurisprudence would alter the Court's Fourth Amendment methodology.
My approach to respect proceeds from the bottom up. All persons are
entitled to respect. Yet certain marginalized groups in our society
disproportionately bear the burden of state-imposed disrespect.79 Moreover,
there are sometimes on-average differences in these groups' perceptions
and experiences as compared to more privileged members of the polity. 0
Understanding respect's meaning in the Fourth Amendment context
therefore requires being especially attentive to whatever salient differences
there may be between minority and majority group perspectives. Where
there are differences, which group's view prevails will be a question of
political morality."1 But it will often be the case that what benefits the
oppressed benefits other people as well. 2 Furthermore, it will always be
the case that examining minority viewpoints will better inform an otherwise
unduly constricted constitutional analysis.
Interestingly, the United States Supreme Court's most detailed
consideration of respect's role under the Fourth Amendment concerned
police treatment of a white, apparently middle-class, woman in Atwater v.
Lago Vista.83 Part II of this article explores in-depth the contrast between
the majority's mere technicality view, in which respect merits little weight,
and Justice O'Connor's dissenting substantive vision, 4 which places
79 See COLE, supra note 37 (documenting this disproportionate burden throughout many
stages of the criminal justice system); infra Part III.C (providing historical support).
80 See supra text accompanying note 62 (summarizing some of the relevant empirical
data); Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2282-2354
(illustrating differing perceptions).
81 See infra Part III.C.
82 See infra text accompanying notes 95-174 (offering illustrations).
83 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
14 See id. at 360 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). I am using Justice O'Connor's dissenting
opinion in Atwater as one example of an approach. to the Fourth Amendment in which
respect plays a central role and am expressing no opinion on whether O'Connor is likely to
pursue that approach in future Fourth Amendment cases. One colleague who read an early
draft of this article complained that Justice O'Connor is an opponent of racial justice, not a
supporter. O'Connor's views on race might, however, be more complex than my colleague
believes. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (authoring the majority opinion,
which affirmed a law school admissions policy seeking racial diversity as justified by
compelling state interests, including breaking down racial stereotypes and promoting cross-
racial understanding). Furthermore, at least Justice O'Connor's words in her Atwater
dissent, if taken at face value, show a sensitivity to the risks of law's modernly contributing
to racial discrimination. See infra text accompanying notes 120-21. Finally, even if I
accepted my colleague's view of O'Connor's approach to racial justice as deceptive,
inconsistent, malicious, and ill-informed, that would not alter the wisdom of her dissenting
opinion in Atwater nor its value in illustrating, and consistency with, the respect-based
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respect at the center of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness
determination. Doing so led Justice O'Connor to express especially grave
concern about the implications of the majority's paradigm for minority
communities in future cases, a concern entirely missing from the Court
majority's reasoning.85 These contrasting opinions help to clarify respect's
meaning and role under the Fourth Amendment. Part II continues that task
of clarification by examining first the idea of respect reflected in America's
history of regulating search and seizure practices, especially during slavery
and Reconstruction, and next examining the emotions of feeling respected
and disrespected. s6 Part II argues that minimizing the emotional sense of
disrespect is relevant to the balancing of interests process involved in
determining the "reasonableness" of searches and seizures. But, concludes
Part II, the more important concept of respect is an "objective" one rooted
in social practice: respect as treating another "fittingly," a concept rooted in
notions of human worth and the need for a sense of belonging to a common
political community. 7 This broad concept will be given concrete meaning
in the text of Part II.
If the principle of respect is derived from history and is expressed in
current social practices, then giving that principle meaning in particular
cases should require more focused historical and social practice inquiries.
Part III adopts precisely this position, exploring three ways in which
American history and current social practices give life to constitutional
principles: first, in encouraging informed intuitions about meaning; second,
in protecting reliance upon reasonable social expectations; and third, in
identifying actual and reasonable social meanings given to search and
seizure practices by both participants and observers concerning when
treatment is "ill-fitting" for a political community of equals. Concerning
this last point, Part III examines the role of subconscious meanings and
offers new interpretations of Plessy v. Ferguson88 and Brown v. Board of
Education.89 These new interpretations offer guidance for choosing when
majority or minority perspectives on respectful treatment should prevail.
That guidance further requires elaboration of the notion of "peoplehood"
approach that I defend here.
85 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
86 See also sources cited infra note 147 (summarizing history); cf Andrew E. Taslitz, The
Limits of Civil Society: Law's Complementary Role in Regulating Harmful Speech, I
MARGINS 305 (2001) [hereinafter Taslitz, Civil Society] (analyzing respect-based emotions
in the context of group-subordinating speech).
87 See infra Part II.D (defining "fittingness").
88 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
89 347 U.S. 483 (1968).
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and what the Fourth Amendment means in describing the rights that it
recognizes as being "of the people." 90
Part IV explains why questions of respect in authorizing and
conducting searches and seizures are better addressed under the Fourth,
rather than the Fourteenth, Amendment. Among these reasons are that the
equal protection clause embraces equality without a substantive vision of
what sort of minimal treatment of persons the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment demand.9' Nor does the due process clause alone do
enough because the Court generally assigns that clause the function of
protecting "truth" at trial.92 But the Fourth Amendment serves other values,
often undermining truth by, for example, excluding accurate evidence of
guilt.93
Part V recounts the practical differences that a respect-based
jurisprudence will make to Fourth Amendment methodology and outcomes.
In particular, a respect-based jurisprudence will sometimes bow to minority
conceptions about what inferences are reasonable in fact-finding, will
consider both racially-discriminatory motives and effects relevant to the
reasonableness balancing process, will consider a broader notion than the
Court now embraces of the social costs of search and seizure practices, will
make heavier use of social science to understand current social practices,
and will seek to learn lessons from the history of search and seizure
practices during slavery, Reconstruction, and modern American history
rather than only during the original framing period of the 1780s and
1790s.94 Part V also offers selected illustrations of how this altered
methodology may alter results in applying a number of Fourth Amendment
doctrines.
Finally, Part VI concludes with a call for a prompt embrace of respect-
based principles and some practical suggestions for implementing them.
90 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; infra Part III.C.4.
91 See infra text accompanying Part IV.B (summarizing equal protection principle's
scope).
92 See infra text accompanying Part IV.A (summarizing central place of truth-finding in
due process case law governing criminal procedure).
93 See, e.g., TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 579-88 (discussing range of values
arguably protected by the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
94 The implications of a respect-based jurisprudence are further explored in Taslitz,
Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note I (applying respect concept to
analyzing four infamous search and seizure cases); Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note
I (focusing on the importance of a respect-full concept of privacy); Taslitz, Racial Auditors,
supra note 45 (focusing on the social science underlying respect-based jurisprudence, the
role of the "political emotions" under the Fourth Amendment, and practical ways to involve
"the People" in setting search and seizure policy and practice).
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II. SEARCHING FOR RESPECT
A. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DISRESPECT
These clashing mere technicality and substantive visions of the Fourth
Amendment are respectively illustrated by the majority and dissenting
opinions in Atwater v. City ofLago Vista,95 decided just recently.
1. Technicalities Triumphant: The Atwater Majority
Gall Atwater was arrested for, and subsequently pled no contest to,
driving without her seatbelt or her two children's seatbelts fastened. These
offenses were punishable by a fine only. Yet Atwater was handcuffed;
taken to the police station in a squad car; booked; ordered to remove her
shoes, jewelry, eyeglasses, and pocket contents and to submit to a mug shot;
and left alone in a jail cell for one hour. Finally, she was taken before a
magistrate, who released her on $310 bond. The Court majority, in a 5-4
decision authored by Justice Souter, held that the officer's conduct had not
violated the Fourth Amendment.
The majority's opinion began with a lengthy examination of history,
but for a narrow purpose: to determine whether a warrantless misdemeanor
arrest not involving a breach of the peace was prohibited by the common
law at the time of the eighteenth century framing.96 While admitting the
ambiguity of the historical record, the Court nevertheless concluded that
there was insufficient evidence of such a common law prohibition. Nor did
tradition since the framing reveal a later embrace of a contrary view. These
historical observations were entitled to great weight, argued the Court.
9' 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
96 For a thorough analysis of the flaws in this new Fourth Amendment originalism, see
David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 CoLUM. L. REv. 1739
(2000). This new approach does not use history to "illuminate ... what particular abuses
most provoked those who framed and ratified the provision in question, and [to determine]
what it was about those abuses that most provoked them." Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the
Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119, 1170 (1995). Rather, the new Fourth
Amendment originalism employs history to preserve "particular legal protections in place at
the time of its framing," putting certain "traditional common-law guarantees . . . beyond
time, place, and judicial predilection." Sklansky, supra, at 1764 (quoting County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 66 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). I would add that
the new Fourth Amendment originalism is selective in choosing what framers' count,
ignoring the framers' of the 1860s, whose work for the first time applied the Fourth
Amendment to the states. See infra Part I.C. Professor Thomas Y. Davies adds, using
Atwater as his primary example, that the Court simply does new Fourth Amendment
originalism badly, getting the history quite wrong. See Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional
Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Diftortions and Evasions of
Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 239 (2002).
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Therefore, those seeking a departure from the framers' understanding bore a
"heavy burden" of justification.
97
The Court nevertheless proceeded to consider whether the balance of
state and individual interests required a new rule. Curiously, the Court
began by seemingly conceding that this balance favored Atwater:
If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested facts of this case,
Atwater might . . . prevail. She was a known resident of Lago Vista with no place to
hide and no incentive to flee, and common sense says she would almost certainly have
buckled up as a condition of driving off with a citation. In her case, the physical
incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer
who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment. Atwater's claim to live free of
pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the city can raise
against it specific to her case.
9
8
Subsequently, however, the Court belittled the invasion of Atwater's
dignity interests. Though humiliating, the Court explained, Atwater's arrest
was "no more 'harmful to ...privacy or . . .physical interests than the
normal custodial arrest."' 99 The arrest and booking were "inconvenient and
embarrassing to Atwater, but not so extraordinary as to violate the Fourth
Amendment."' 00 In any event, these invasions were justified by probable
cause and thus almost definitionally reasonable.
Equally important was the Court's disapproval of "standards requiring
sensitive, case-by-case determination of government need, lest every
discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for
constitutional review."' 0 ' Because the Fourth Amendment is to be applied
in the heat of the moment, said the Court, clear, simple, readily
administrable rules are needed. Atwater's proposed rule-that warrantless
arrests for minor crimes not accompanied by violence or its threat be
forbidden-failed this test. In the Court's view, Atwater's proposal put too
heavy a burden on officers' distinguishing minor from major crimes. Nor
would a tie-breaking rule for the police---"if in doubt, do not arrest"-make
sense because it would "boil down to something akin to a 'least-restrictive-
alternative limitation,' which is itself one of those 'ifs, and, and buts' rules
.. .generally thought inappropriate in working out Fourth Amendment
protection.' 0 2
97 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346 n.14.
98 Id. at 346-47.
99 Id. at 354.
'oo Id. at 355.
10" Id. at 347.
102 Id. at 350. The Court's unexplained rejection of a "least restrict alternative"
requirement to limit state power under the Fourth Amendment is troubling because the
Fourth Amendment is a "fundamental right"; the violation of such rights generally mandates
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Of greater concern to the Court was that police fear of liability for a
mistaken judgment would create disincentives to arrest, and the "costs to
society of such underenforcement could easily outweigh the costs to
defendants of being needlessly arrested .... Moreover, said the Court,
there was little reason to believe that warrantless arrests for petty offenses
were a significant nationwide problem. Few other examples of such cases,
emphasized the Court, were noted in the briefs or at oral argument. If
arrests are to be prohibited for certain offenses, state legislatures, not being
bound by general principles in the same way as are courts addressing
constitutional questions, are better equipped to act. Prompt probable cause
hearings, combined with categorical rules giving way to individualized
review when a suspect proves that he or she was arrested in an
extraordinary manner, provided, according to the Court, further protections
against abusive arrests. "The upshot of all these influences, combined with
the good sense (and, failing that, the political accountability) of most local
lawmakers and law enforcement officials, is a dearth of horribles
demanding redress."'104  The dissent's claims to the contrary, said the
majority, were "speculative," there being no indication that potential abuse
had ever "ripened into reality.'
10 5
"strict scrutiny," which definitionally permits state infringement only where no less
restrictive (that is, less invasive) alternatives are available. See MILTON R. KONVITZ,
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: HISTORY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 16-17, 84, 158 (2001)
(concluding that the Fourth Amendment is a fundamental right that should be protected by
strict scrutiny); JEROME A. BARROW & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 167 (1995) (declaring that, "[w]hen federal or state legislation burdens the
exercise of fundamental personal rights, the courts . . . demand that government establish
that the law is narrowly tailored to a compelling or substantial governmental interest,"
though further noting that in practice "the standard employed is not always uniform"); see
generally Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 197 (1993) [hereinafter Maclin, Central Meaning] (arguing that the Court wrongly
analyzes Fourth Amendment questions under a rational basis standard of review when a
compelling justification standard is more appropriate).
103 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 351.
104 Id. at 353.
... Id. at 353 n.25. The Court conceded that there must be other instances of abuse of
which it was unaware "but just as surely, the country is not confronting anything like an
epidemic of minor-offense arrests." Id. at 353. Moreover, the Court agreed that Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), supported a "more finely tuned approach to the Fourth
Amendment." Atwater, 532 U.S. at 347 n.16. But the Court asserted, more than proved, that




2. A Substantive Vision.- The Atwater Dissent
The dissent, authored by Justice O'Connor, and joined by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, rejected the majority's methodology in its
entirety. 6 Finding history inconclusive, and describing it as but one of the
tools in the reasonableness inquiry, Justice O'Connor proceeded directly to
interest balancing.
In doing so, Justice O'Connor repeatedly stressed that both Atwater's
privacy and liberty interests had been violated. Concerning Atwater's right
to locomotion, a full custodial arrest was especially intrusive, in Justice
O'Connor's view, because arrest violated Atwater's reasonable expectations
as a motorist. Ordinarily a motorist stopped by an officer expects to spend
a short period of time answering questions while her license and registration
are checked. The motorist assumes, Justice O'Connor declared, that a
citation will follow, but she will then be allowed to proceed on her way.
Atwater's arrest contradicted these reasonable expectations.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor noted, an arrestee may be detained up to
forty-eight hours before a magistrate determines whether there was
probable cause for the arrest. 10 7  That period is potentially dangerous
because the nonviolent offender may be housed together with violent ones.
After release, the fact of a driver's arrest also becomes a permanent part of
the public record. Although Atwater was not herself housed with violent
offenders, she did suffer the fear and humiliation of arrest, then, upon
release, returned to the scene to find that her car had been towed.
Justice O'Connor was especially concerned that this extended
infringement on Atwater's freedom of movement imposed special costs
upon her and her children:
With respect to the . . .goal of child welfare, the decision to arrest Atwater was
nothing short of counterproductive. Atwater's children witnessed Officer Turek yell
at their mother and threaten to take them all into custody. Ultimately, they were
forced to leave her behind with Turek, knowing that she was being taken to jail.
Understandably, the 3-year old boy was "very, very traumatized ...." After the
incident, he had to see a child psychologist regularly, who reported that the boy "felt
very guilty that he couldn't stop this horrible thing[;] ... he was powerless to help his
mother or sister ...." Both of Atwater's children are now terrified at the sight of any
police car . . . . According to Atwater, the arrest "just never leaves us. It's a
conversation we have every other day, once a week, and it's-it raises its head
constantly in our lives."
' 10 8
106 See 532 U.S. at 360-73 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107 See id. at 364 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (relying on County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991)).
108 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 370 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Atwater had also asked Officer
Turek to allow her to take her frightened children to a nearby friend's house, but Turek
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Ticketing Atwater, by contrast, would, Justice O'Connor emphasized,
have taught her to ensure that her children were buckled up in the future,
while teaching her children to accept responsibility and obey the law.
Instead, they were taught that "the bad person could just as easily be the
policeman as it could be the most horrible person they could imagine."' 0 9
Justice O'Connor also believed that the danger to Atwater's and other
vehicle-code-violators' privacy interests was great. Driver-arrestees are
subject to a full search of their person and confiscation of their possessions.
Their entire passenger compartment and packages therein are subject to
search, and their car may be impounded and its contents inventoried."0
This extreme invasion of drivers' privacy interests violated the
principle of proportionality that Justice O'Connor found to be inherent in
the idea of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Atwater's offense was not
subject to imprisonment, and Atwater was a local resident posing neither a
flight risk nor a danger to -the community. She had immediately
apologized, accepting responsibility for her actions, thus suggesting that she
would comply with the seatbelt law in the future. Were the costs imposed
upon her extended to the significant number of fine-only offenses in this
country, there would be "potentially serious consequences for the everyday
lives of Americans.""'
Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor recognized that there may be unusual
cases in which an arrest for a fine-only offense was necessary. To provide
for this possibility, Justice O'Connor proposed this rule: Where there is
probable cause to believe that a fine-only offense has been committed, the
officer should ordinarily only issue a citation; he may, however, proceed
further if he points to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with
rational inferences drawn from those facts, reasonably warrant the
additional intrusion of a full custodial arrest. 12 That rule set no less of a
clear and simple bright-line, said Justice O'Connor, than did the majority's
standard, because the probable cause required for the traffic citation itself
"must be measured by the facts of the particular case."'' 3
Furthermore, although Justice O'Connor agreed that certainty was a
worthy Fourth Amendment value, "it by no means trumps the values of
refused. See id. at 324. Luckily, Atwater's friend learned about the incident and quickly
arrived to take charge of the children. See id. When Atwater had asked Turek to lower his
voice to avoid further scaring the children, he jabbed his finger in her face and responded,
"You're going to jail." Id. at 368 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'09 Id. at 370 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
110 For details on why this is so, see TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 335-42, 396-401.
111 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 371 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 364 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"1 Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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liberty and privacy at the heart of the Amendment's protections." 1 14 In any
event, she explained, the proposed rule derived from the Terry stop-and-
frisk doctrine, which had proven workable for street officers for the past
thirty years." s More importantly to Justice O'Connor, "[w]hat the Terry
rule lacks in precision it makes up for in fidelity to the Fourth
Amendment's command of reasonableness and sensitivity to the competing
values protected by that Amendment."
'' 6
As for the majority's fear that officer liability would create
disincentives for arrests, Justice O'Connor was dismissive. The qualified
immunity doctrine, she believed, adequately protected officers who, for
example, reasonably but mistakenly believed that a suspect posed a flight
risk or danger to the community and therefore had to be arrested. "Of
course, even the specter of liability can entail substantial social costs, such
as inhibiting public officials in the discharge of their duties," O'Connor
conceded. But, she declared, "We may not ignore the central command of
the Fourth Amendment, however, to avoid these costs." 1 7 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, Justice O'Connor worried far more than did the
majority about the "unfettered discretion" its decision granted to officers to
make arrest decisions." 8 The mere existence of a significant risk of abuse,
not proof of its widespread realization-which can prove elusive-was all
that O'Connor required." 9  The small number of published cases
concerning similar arrests therefore "proves little," she said, and "should
provide little solace."' 20  "[A]s the recent debate over racial profiling
demonstrates all too clearly," a "relatively minor traffic infraction may
often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual."' 2'
Precisely because the Court has eschewed inquiry into officers'
motivations, 22 however, O'Connor believed that the Justices must
"vigilantly ensure that officers' poststop actions . ..comport with the
114 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
115 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (relying upon Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),
which held that an officer may make a "stop"-a minimally intrusive seizure of the person-
on reasonable suspicion rather than full probable cause).
116 532 U.S. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 368 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority, in turn, dismissed Justice
O'Connor's reliance on the "panacea" of qualified immunity. See id. at 351 n.22. Qualified
immunity would protect police from liability but not from the time and expense of litigation,
placing impossible burdens on police, who must act quickly. See id.
118 Id. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119 See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
121 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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Fourth Amendment's guarantee of reasonableness. '2 3 Instead, the "Court
neglects the Fourth Amendment's command in the name of administrative
ease" and "cloaks the pointless indignity that Gail Atwater suffered with the
mantle of reasonableness."
1 24
3. Assessing Justice O'Connor's Substantive Vision
Justice O'Connor's dissent, whatever its imperfections, clearly
embraced a substantive vision of Fourth Amendment rights. She closely
attended to the nature and extent of infringement on Atwater's interests,
including especially her right to locomotion.1 25 Justice O'Connor further
examined the plausible significant costs to society as a whole of a per se
rule permitting arrests upon probable cause for fine-only offenses. These
risks were sufficient to justify rejecting such a per se rule, unless the state
met its burden of showing that those risks were not being, and would not
be, realized in practice. Additionally, she condemned the humiliating,
disrespectful treatment of Atwater by the police, causing her and her
children continuing psychological pain and fear, thus wounding healthy
familial relationships and undermining trust in the police force.'2 6 These
injuries demonstrated to Justice O'Connor the importance of constraining,
rather than deferentially embracing, police officer discretion.1 27 Critically,
Justice O'Connor conceived of free movement and privacy as zones of
sovereignty,128 requiring pressing justifications, such as physical danger or
imminent flight, to justify infringement. Even then, and even given
individualized evidence of wrongdoing in the form of probable cause,
infringement had to be proportionate.
The costs of a jurisprudence of mere technicalities would be
intolerable were they widespread. Middle class whites certainly pay some
123 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 373 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
12- See generally Maclin, Right to Locomotion, supra note 51 (arguing that the Court has
provided increasingly less protection to the right to locomotion, perhaps even less protection
than it gives to the right of privacy).
126 On the importance of citizen trust in the police under the Fourth Amendment, see
Scott Sundby, "Everyman's" Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751 (1994).
127 See generally Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn From
Vagueness Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398 (2001) [hereinafter Maclin, Vagueness
Doctrine] (discussing limiting police officer discretion as a central purpose of the Fourth
Amendment).
128 See Luna, supra note 74, at 829-31 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment must be
understood especially to protect, subject only to weighty and unusual countervailing
interests, "sovereign zones" in which the idiosyncratic and unique individual can "do
anything and everything" to develop his special skills, talents, and capacities).
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price, but the costs fall disproportionately on minorities. 29  As Justice
O'Connor apparently recognized, increased officer discretion is most likely
to be used against minorities, especially those sub-communities that are
poor. In the words of Anthony V. Bouza, former chief of police in
Minneapolis and commander of the Bronx police force,
There is a clear, yet subliminal, message being transmitted [by society] that the cops,
if they are to remain on the payroll, had better obey.
The overclass-mostly white, well-off, educated, suburban, and voting-wants the
underclass-frequently minority, homeless, jobless, uneducated, and excluded-
controlled and, preferably, kept out of sight. Property rights are more sacred than
human lives. And some lives are more precious than others.
130
4. Taking Stock: The Court Equivocates
I do not want to leave the misimpression that the Court majority
always embraces a mere technicality vision of the Fourth Amendment. To
the contrary, the Court generally views Fourth Amendment interests in one
location-the home-as meriting significant protection.' 3' Invasions of the
home routinely require both probable cause and a search or arrest warrant,
as well as fair notice to the occupants concerning what is about to
happen. 132 Moreover, the Court does at least still require probable cause for
arrests outside the home, 33 although Atwater demonstrates that this
mandate may not in fact reflect anything approaching a substantive vision
of Fourth Amendment freedoms.
But outside the home, the mere technicality vision generally rules.
Ample exceptions are made to the exclusionary rule. 134  Most initial
interferences with the right to locomotion fall far short of an arrest. Yet
many such intrusions are permitted as "voluntary encounters," requiring no
129 See generally COLE, supra note 37 (defending this point).
130 ANTHONY V. BOUZA, POLICE UNBOUND: CORRUPTION, ABUSE, AND HEROISM BY THE
BoYs IN BLUE 13 (2001)
131 See also Kyllo v. United States, 532 U.S. 27 (2001) (declaring that the Fourth
Amendment draws "a firm line at the entrance to the house"). Cf Luna, supra note 74, at
849-56 (making analogous point).
132 See id.; see also TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 250-52, 269-70 (summarizing
case law).
133 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 269-70 (summarizing case law).
134 Thus, the rule does not apply if officers acted in objectively reasonable good faith, if
there is an independent source for the wrongly seized evidence or it inevitably would have
been discovered, if the connection between the violation and the evidence is "attenuated," if
a defendant is being impeached at trial, or if the evidence is offered in ordinary civil cases,
administrative or deportation proceedings, probation and parole revocation proceedings, civil
tax proceedings, and civil forfeiture cases. See id. at 524-75.
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suspicion at all, or "stops," requiring only "reasonable suspicion. ' ' m
Although this latter requirement supposedly retains a mandate of
individualized suspicion, in practice, trial courts defer to police judgments
based on generalizations and stereotyping.'36 Property protection is
diminished too, automobiles notably being subject to frequent seizure as a
concomitant to arrest. 37 It is not that the Court provides no protection, but
rather that, outside the home, individual and sub-community interests are
too often easily outweighed by the needs of law enforcement. 
3 8
This stark diminishment in protection also extends to privacy
interests-which are the usual focus of the Court's Fourth Amendment
analyses. 39 Thus:
Whether infected by some form of hindsight bias, or a distancing effect, the Court has
allowed increased police discretion in surveillance activities despite the privacy
expectations of most citizens. Law enforcement may ignore "no trespassing" signs
and jump over locked fences to sneak onto the property surrounding homes. They
may snoop into the buildings adjacent to a residence, peering at even the most private
activity occurring in sheds or barns. Police may parse through garbage bags to
uncover everything from what someone reads to the medicine she takes. Government
officials can obtain the telephone numbers that individuals dial from their homes in
order to determine whom they have called, whether it be their mothers, paramours, or
lawyers. And law enforcement may fly over homes in planes or helicopters, spying
on backyard barbeques, sunbathing, and romantic interludes .... These intrusions
can be undertaken without judicial oversight and in the absence of a warrant or
probable cause.140
Furthermore, there is no fixed coalition on one side of the divide or the
other, individual Justices often switching sides in the debate.' 4' But, with
rare exceptions, a majority is generally mustered for the mere technicality
vision outside the home. And that is a vision, as the Court majority's
opinion in Atwater demonstrates, in which concepts such as respect, human
dignity, and humiliation-minimization have little or no place.
' See id. at 299-316, 438-43.
136 See generally David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments:
Supreme Court Rhetoric v. Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
975 (1998) [hereinafter Harris, Particularized Suspicion].
137 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 396-99.
138 See Maclin, Right to Locomotion, supra note 51, at 1288, 1328-34 (making similar
point regarding the right to locomotion).
139 See id. at 1328-30 (bemoaning the Court's over-emphasis on privacy to the
disparagement of other Fourth Amendment interests).
140 Luna, supra note 74, at 827-28.
141 See supra notes 95-130 and accompanying text.
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B. DISRESPECT IN AMERICAN HISTORY
The Court's failure to appreciate the importance of respect as a guiding
constitutional value stems in part from its constricted vision of history.
Courts generally, and the Supreme Court especially, 142 until very recently
often ignored history in giving constitutional meaning to the broad words of
the Fourth Amendment. When they have addressed history, they have
focused on 1791, the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 43 The
original Bill of Rights applied, however, only to the federal government,
not to the states.' 44 But most criminal prosecutions are at the state and local
level. 45  It was only with the 1868 ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment that most of the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth
Amendment's search and seizure provisions, were "incorporated" against
the states. 146 Yet the Fourteenth Amendment stemmed from our nation's
142 See generally TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30 (summarizing and analyzing high
Court's Fourth Amendment cases, finding few that seriously rely on the amendment's
history). For a fascinating recent revisionist history of the Fourth Amendment, see Thomas
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999); see also
Tracy Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L.
REv. 925 (1997). Between the 1970s and the 1990s, the United States Supreme Court rarely
relied on history in Fourth Amendment cases. See Sklansky, supra note 96, at 1741, 1760.
During the 1990s, Justice Scalia advocated, and the Court flirted with, relying heavily on
history in a new Fourth Amendment originalism. See id. at 1754-60. In 1999, the Court
finally embraced that originalism. See id. at 1760. However, the weight given to, and depth
of, the Court's historical inquiry is unclear. Compare Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295
(1999) (declaring that only if historical inquiry yields no answer will the Court turn to
traditional standards of reasonableness balancing) with Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532
U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (describing inquiry into what the framers' regarded as reasonable as
"obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive") (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
591 (1980)); Sklansky, supra note 96, at 1760-61 (contending that in some cases historical
inquiry involved little more than reference to historical platitudes and maxims). The Court
has also continued at times to eschew historical analysis entirely. See Sklansky, supra note
96, at 1761 n.144 (noting that the Court ignored common law history in three major Fourth
Amendment cases in its 2000 term, but speculating that this was so because those cases were
so easily resolved under earlier precedent); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67
(2001) (using traditional reasonableness balancing rather than history to judge the
constitutionality of a drug-testing program for pregnant women). What is clear is that the
Court looks to the framers of 1791 rather than 1867 and 1868.
143 See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999); sources cited supra note 142.
144 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 39-40.
145 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4 (2d ed. 1992)
("Within our federated system of government, it is the states that have borne the primary
responsibility for defining criminal behavior and enforcing the law against those who engage
in such behavior.").. But see Sara Sun-Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to
Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995)
(examining the increasing federalization of the criminal law).
146 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 39-40.
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troubled history with slavery and the South's violent resistance during
Reconstruction to changing the racial status quo. Again, though rarely
recognized, slavery was partly defined by the deprivation of Fourth
Amendment interests in freedom of movement, privacy, and property. A
slave could not go where he pleased on a plantation unless permitted to do
so by his owner. The slave certainly could not leave the plantation, quit his
"job," and find work elsewhere. Nor could he set off for school, visit or
even make friends nearby, or engage in the other myriad activities of life
that freedom of movement ensures.
147
Privacy, whether in the sense of seclusion from private eyes or
autonomy to make one's own life choices, was unheard of as a slave
entitlement. 148 No slave actions could be freed from the master's prying
eyes if he heard of them or wished to stop or observe them. 149  Slave
women similarly had no right or ability to resist masters' sexual overtures
on the grounds that the women's sexuality was a private matter of their own
choice. 150
Slaves also could not usually own property, though they might keep
some at the masters' sufferance. Yet slaves were themselves property.5 1
147 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More! The Implications of the Informed Citizen
Ideal Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 738-43
(1999) [hereinafter Taslitz, Slaves No More.] (outlining connection between slave history
and the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment).
148 See, e.g., JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD
SOUTH 145 (1990).
For slaves there was no such thing as a right of privacy. To be a slave could mean filing past the
master to be examined for cleanliness, for tom clothes, or for receipt of weekly rations. Slave
cabins were not simply built to the masters' specifications; they were open to periodic
inspections. One owner required his overseer to "visit every Negro house at daylight" to see that
the slaves were out and "once a week or more .... after horn blow at night, to see that all are
in." An overseer boasted that "once or twice in the month, I made it my business to visit each
Negro house: I examined everything therein; saw that the Negroes permitted no dirt or filth."
Id. See also Lloyd L. Weinreb, The Fourth Amendment Today, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING, supra note 8, at 185 (defining the
meanings of privacy under the Fourth Amendment); MICHAEL WAYNE: DEATH OF AN
OVERSEER: REOPENING A MURDER INVESTIGATION FROM THE PLANTATION SOUTH 96 (2001)
("Servants... warned other slaves when their cabins were to be searched ....
149 See sources cited supra notes 147-48.
15o See Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual
Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1335 (2000) [hereinafter Taslitz, Contract of Mutual
Indifference] (summarizing sexual plight of African American women); RANDALL KENNEDY,
RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 34-35 (1997) (similar).
151 See JENNY BOURNE WAHL, THE BONDMAN'S BURDEN: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
COMMON LAW OF SOUTHERN SLAVERY 157-58, 256-57 n. 133 (Arthur McEvoy & Christopher
Tomlins eds., 1998) (discussing how slaves could not own property but could sometimes
control it at the master's sufferance); THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE
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All these restrictions on slave freedoms were declared by law or
enforced by legal practice. These sorts of restrictions were essential to
marking the slave as outside the community of political and social equals.
52
The "socially dead" and excluded slave belonged to a group of a reviled
status." 3 The slaves understood, albeit not in precisely this language, the
disrespect for them inherent in the Old South's laws and practices 5 4 Yet
slavery could not exist if the slave could "quit," leave the plantation, seek
work elsewhere, keep the property he earned "by the sweat of his brow,"
and find peace, safety, and privacy in the nighttime embrace of family.1
55
When the Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery after the Civil War,
the South's restrictions of former slaves' freedoms of movement, privacy,
and property did not end.15 6 Black codes were passed, essentially requiring
the freedmen to work for their former masters.15 7 Passes were required to
leave the plantation. 5 8 Violent night riders like the Ku Klux Klan assaulted
and terrorized former slaves, restoring white "honor" and black
subjugation. 59 Many of these night riders were state officials, and state
policy otherwise often sanctioned the violence.160 State-enforced disrespect
by infringement of Fourth Amendment freedoms thus continued. The
current meaning of the Fourth Amendment thus requires looking through
the lens of search and seizure practices during slavery and Reconstruction.
As I have demonstrated elsewhere, that lens reveals the idea of respect
articulated here to be a central Fourth Amendment value.'
6'
LAW, 1619-1866, 61-80 (Thomas A. Green & Hendrik Hartog eds., 1996) (describing slaves
as property).
152 See Taslitz, Contract of Mutual Indifference, supra note 150, at 1283-1337
(documenting history showing slave exclusion from the American social contract).
153 See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 38-
65 (1982) (analogizing slavery to social death).
154 See Taslitz, Contract of Mutual Indifference, supra note 150, at 1316-37.
155 See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147, at 740-43; Taslitz, Contract of Mutual
Indifference, supra note 150, at 1381 (quoting Cong. Globe, 3 8th Cong., It Sess., 2990,
which records debates over the Thirteenth Amendment) (declaring the position of some
Republicans that emancipation vested each freed slave with "inalienable rights ... to live
and live in a state of freedom ... to breathe the free air and enjoy God's free sunshine ... to
till the soil, to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow... to the endearment and enjoyment
of family ties").
156 See Taslitz, Contract of Mutual Indifference, supra note 150, at 1379-87.
'57 See id. at 1383-87.
'5 See id.
9 See id.
160 See id.; Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147, at 147-48.
161 See generally Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147 (illustrating effect of viewing
modem Fourth Amendment as incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment
through the lens of search and seizure practices during slavery and Reconstruction); Taslitz,
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C. RESPECT AS AN EMOTION
"Respect," as used here, is thus partly a historical concept, but it is also
a sociological one. To understand the current relevance of the history of
Fourth Amendment disrespect, we must understand the meaning of respect
for minority communities affected by searches and seizures.162 History and
sociology reveal an idea of respect as beginning with those most vulnerable
to search and seizure abuses.163 In the 1800s, it was the slaves and, later,
the freedmen. Today it is certain subsets of minority communities. 64 By
protecting the most vulnerable among us, however, we protect all
Americans. 
65
Whites are frequently victimized by the same sorts of disrespectful
police officer conduct as are racial and ethnic minorities. Most often it is
working class and poor whites who suffer. Because modem public culture
more easily recognizes racial and ethnic ties than class ones, class-based
abuses of individuals are not so readily understood as having ill
consequences for lower income whites as a group. 166 Class-consciousness
is weak in America. 67 White involvement in the criminal justice system
also gets less media attention than minority, especially African American,
involvement. 68 Yet whites suffer just the same, this observation more than
occasionally even being true of middle-class whites.1
69
Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2280-81 (linking the view through
this lens to the fundamental value of "respect").
162 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note I (providing
extended illustration of this point).
163 See Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45 (providing extended analysis and
illustration of the political science and sociological literature supporting a view of the Fourth
Amendment from the "bottom up," that is, from the perspective of those groups most
vulnerable to oppressive search and seizure practices); cf Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and
Institutional Design, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183 (2003) (discussing importance of
gaining minority citizens' trust by hearing their voices); Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note
147 (reviewing key aspects of the relevant history). I detail that history in far greater detail
in a forthcoming book.
164 See sources cited supra note 163.
165 Cf CAROLINE FORRELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN, at xvii-xxii, 3-7 (2000) (making an analogous
argument, specifically that adopting a "reasonable woman" standard protects men too).
166 See Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45, at 266-67; WILLIAM J. CHAMBLISS,
POWER, POLITICS, AND CRIME 100-24 (1999) (discussing police treatment of "the white lower
class").
167 See, e.g., BELL HOOKS, WHERE WE STAND: CLASS MATTERS, at vii-viii, 1-9,93 (2001).
168 See generally ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE
WHITE MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 78-93 (Susan Herbst & Benjamin I. Page eds.,
2000).
169 See, e.g., CHAMBLISS, supra note 166, at 100-24 (describing police treatment of lower
2003]
ANDREWE. TASLITZ
One of my friends, a white, middle-class professional, tells this story (I
paraphrase, as I did not expect to hear, and thus did not tape-record, this
tale):
I had a few drinks coming home from a party, so I asked my wife to drive. As we got
near the highway exit to our home, two officers pulled us over. They questioned my
wife, a bit too abruptly, I thought. I interjected something in response to one of the
officers' questions to my wife. The officer gruffly told me that he would arrest me if I
said one more word. I said something like, "You don't have to talk to her so
roughly," and the officer pulled me out of the car, cuffed me, charged me with
resisting arrest and public drunkenness, and kept me overnight in a jail cell. My case
was ultimately dismissed on some legal motion, but the judge lectured me in open
court about being drunk in public (I had had two drinks and never left my car). I felt
insulted and degraded by the officers and by the court. No one recognized that a
wrong had been done to me, and I received no apology. Ever since, I don't trust the
police, and I more easily understand when minorities complain about them.
170
None of what is said here is meant to disparage the police. I am a
former prosecutor who spent much time working with the police. Many
officers are honest, good people struggling to do their best at a difficult job.
Even for such officers, however, there are institutional notions of what
constitutes "professionalism" and doing a "good job"-notions often
endorsed by the law-that have ill social effects. 171  Subconscious
assumptions can also lead good and well-trained officers astray. 172 Those
officers who are less well-intentioned or less well-trained magnify the
problem intensely.1
73
class whites); infra text accompanying note 170 (recounting story of police abuse of middle
class whites).
170 This conversation took place in the fall of 1999. For more information on abusive
police traffic stops, see David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why
"Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999); David A. Harris, Car Wars:
The Fourth Amendment's Death on the Highways, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV 556 (1998).
... See, e.g., CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN
THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 175-99 (2003); JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE
THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE (1993); Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 983-
91, 1008-13 (1999) (tracing often subconscious psychological mechanisms and aspects of
police culture that lead even well-meaning police to engage in racially motivated searches
and seizures); see also TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 425-26 (summarizing research on
police culture and psychological processes contributing to racially discriminatory law
enforcement).
172 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 425-26; Thompson, supra note 171, at 983-91,
1008-13.
173 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 425-26.Thompson, supra note 171, at 983-91,
1008-13.
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My goal, therefore, in encouraging a jurisprudence of respect is partly
to help the police truly do a better job by re-defining professionalism.
74
The lead must come from the courts, but all branches of government must
alter their search and seizure policies and practices. The courts and other
branches must learn from history, a history of physical and emotional abuse
of minority communities.
D. RE-DEFINING RESPECT AS TREATING FITTINGLY
1. Hyper- and Hypo-Sensitive Groups
The idea of respect as an emotion is nevertheless inadequate standing
alone because it does not address the problems of hyper- and hypo-sensitive
groups.175 A "hypersensitive" group is one that continues to feel insulted
despite society's best efforts at fair treatment. 76  That sense of insult
dissipates only when the group gets precisely the result that it wants.
For example, a right-to-life group who blocks the entrance to an
abortion clinic still commits criminal trespass. If the protestors refuse to
leave when ordered to do so by the police, the police may lawfully arrest
the protestors. The police clearly have probable cause to do so-
furthermore, if we assume that the arrests are done neither harshly nor
because of political animus, the police action seems justified, even
required. 177 If the right-to-life group members nevertheless feel insulted by
174 For general background on police ethics and professionalism, see MORAL ISSUES IN
POLICE WORK (Frederick A. Elliston & Michael Feldberg eds., 1985).
175 The terms "hypersensitive" and "hyposensitive" groups are mine. I do not mean by
these terms to suggest that members of these groups do not deserve to be listened to or
accommodated. But certain accommodations go beyond the pale of what political morality
requires or permits.
176 This description might fairly characterize those Miami Cuban-Americans who refused
to relinquish Elian Gonzales to his father, despite the extensive efforts of the Clinton
Administration to hear their complaints. See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment
Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2327-55.
177 This conclusion is true for three reasons: first, the protesters direct their ire at the
ethics of abortion, not the wisdom of criminal trespass laws; second, given that the Court has
held that there is a constitutional right to abortion rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment,
permitting trespass denies the clinic's patients a right that our society deems central to
personhood; third, although the protesters are entitled to challenge the wisdom of the right,
sound principles of civil disobedience require them to accept punishment to vindicate the
rule of law where their chosen method of dissent violates state criminal codes. See, e.g., S.
JONATHAN BASS, BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS: MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., EIGHT WHITE
RELIGIOUS LEADERS, AND THE "LETTER FROM A BIRMINGHAM JAIL" 110-30 (2001)
(summarizing the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s philosophy of non-violent
disobedience); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 290-92 (3d ed. 2001)
(explaining why courts generally, and many commentators, do not recognize a necessity or
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being thwarted from blocking patients' entry to the clinic, that group should
not be free to exercise an emotional veto of the trespass laws.
A "hyposensitive" group is one that does not feel insulted despite
questionable conduct by the police. Here the danger is one of false
consciousness.178  Suppose that police believe that Asian Americans are
more likely than non-Asian whites to transport illegal drugs. Accordingly,
the police stop many more Asian Americans than non-Asian American
motorists on trumped-up speeding charges. If the Asian American drivers
believe that the officers are honest,' 79 and if the officers treat the drivers
courteously, the drivers may feel respectfully treated. Yet the police are by
hypothesis singling out these drivers based on an insulting group stereotype.
The driver's ignorance of that fact does not excuse the police misconduct.
In this situation, unlike with the right-to-life protestors, the police acted
disrespectfully because they have treated others unfittingly.
2. Fittingness
Respect as fittingness is the idea that each person is entitled to be
treated in accordance with his status concerning some specified attribute.'
80
Any lesser treatment is insulting. The status is objective: It either exists or
"political necessity" defense to indirect civil disobedience-violating laws other than the one
that you wish to protest). But see David Lyons, Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and
Civil Disobedience, 27 PIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1998) (attempting to cast doubt on the idea
that civil disobedients must accept punishment for their actions). In any event, the abortion
protestor hypothetical articulated here does not violate any of the six principles of respect
that I have articulated elsewhere. See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect,
supra note 1, at 2282-84.
178 See, e.g., ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 149-51
(Marshall Cohen ed., 1988) (explaining the definition and role of false consciousness and
cognate concepts in various feminist theories); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I
Cultural Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 404-
19 (1996) [hereinafter Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories 1] (discussing how cognitive and affective
processes blind persons from recognizing certain wrongs done to them).
179 The reasons for the drivers' believing in the honesty of the police might affect our
choice of terminology. Strictly speaking, some theorists would not describe the drivers'
simple ignorance of the practice of racial profiling as "false consciousness." See sources
cited supra note 178. On the other hand, if the drivers shared a belief in the trustworthiness
of state authority, thus refusing to accept or even see evidence showing that racial profiling
was afoot, that would be false consciousness. See sources cited supra note 177. Either way,
being accepting of demeaning treatment, whether due to your ignorance or false
consciousness, does not alter the treatment's nature as demeaning.
180 See GEOFFREY CUPIT, JUSTICE AS FITTINGNESS 1-2 (1996). Cupit sees "respect" and
"justice" as both parts of the fittingness family of concepts, with respect being the broader
idea. See id. at 15-28. His distinctions are subtle and complex but of no moment whatsoever
for the arguments made here, so I now ignore them, though I will return to them in future
publications.
[Vol. 94
RESPECT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
it does not.18' Thus a trustworthy co-worker is treated unfittingly if other
co-workers act as if he is not trustworthy. That both he and his co-workers
honestly believe that he is untrustworthy does not alter the fact that he has
been treated unfittingly.1
82
Human rights theorists generally agree that in some respect all humans
are alike, thus all sharing the same status and requiring treatment befitting
that status.' 83 Theorists debate what attribute of sameness all humans share.
Some think that it is being made in "the image of God," others that it is the
capacity to achieve moral goodness, and still others (the Kantians) that it is
rationality and autonomy-humans' nature as self-directing beings
legislating their own life plans.!8 4 Whatever the quality that we all share,
that quality entails certain rights or entitlements without which our status as
humans is ignored.18 5 Freedom of conscience, privacy, the right to own
property earned by the sweat of our brow, and freedom of movement are
among the rights commonly deemed to belong to every person simply by
nature of her humanity. 86 Furthermore, many fittingness theorists agree
that these sorts of entitlements necessarily imply diversity in life choices.1
8 7
Respect must therefore be shown for the sorts of differences that are central
181 See CUtIT, supra note 180, at 15.
112 See id.
183 See JOHN E. COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A
WESTERN INSIGHT 3-15 (1999) (discussing how all rights in Western political thought are
justified by appeal to an idea of a "distinctive existent" quality shared in equal measure by
all humans).
114 See id. at 13, 116-22 (summarizing and contrasting Kantian theory and alternative of
capacity to achieve moral goodness); MICHAEL J. PERRY, TIH IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR
INQUIRIES 11-41 (1998) (arguing that the idea of human rights is "ineliminably religious");
WILLIAM F. SCHULTZ, IN OUR OwN BEST INTEREST: How DEFENDING HUMAN RIGHTS
BENEFITS Us ALL 17-37 (2001) (offering pragmatic arguments for accepting the ideas of
human rights and equality).
185 See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1659, 1697 (1992).
186 See, e.g., JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, & INTENT 13-56, 73-75 (1999) (recognizing privacy, property, and free
movement as universal rights); cf Martha Minow, Equality and the Bill of Rights, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 118, 118-28 (Michael J.
Meyer & William A. Parents eds., 1992) (discussing how human dignity and equality are
embraced in the Bill of Rights, especially in the protections of the First Amendment).
187 Professor Cupit is responsible for the terminology of "fittingness," an idea that
captures an underlying similarity among theorists writing about respect, dignity, insult, and
humiliation. I thus refer to them all as "fittingness theorists." On the importance of diversity
in life choices, see Jean Hampton, Retribution and the Liberal State, 1993 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 117, 140-41 (defending a "perfectionist liberalism" in which the state must
promote "'value pluralism,' so that the citizenry have plenty of options and opportunities to
choose from in creating their lives").
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to personal identity. 188  Many of these differences are rooted in our
identification with historically important social groups, each person's total
set of overlapping connections to such groups helping to define who he
uniquely is. 8 9 That individual-group connection requires fitting treatment
for both.' 90
3. Fittingness and Belongingness
But how can we determine in an individual case whether we have
"treated" someone fittingly? That is a question I will answer in Part III; I
first want to examine one aspect of fitting treatment: encouraging a sense of
"belongingness."
To treat someone as a whole-as uniquely complete in himself-is
status-enhancing, expressing the idea that each human is of equal and
infinite worth. 19 Simultaneously treating a person as a part or member of a
valued broader whole-as someone essential to making society what it is-
is also status-enhancing. 92 The idea of "partnership" best expresses this
ideal: each of us is a whole unto ourselves yet a valuable partner committed
to, and essential for, the greater good. 1
93
A different way to make this same point is to view fitting treatment as
treatment that is not humiliating-that does not act as if we are outside the
family of man. 194 All men are entitled to membership in some political
society, albeit not necessarily in any particular one. Members of a political
society who are treated as not full members-as second-class citizens-
usually face that fate because they are viewed as less than fully human.1 95
That perceived sub-humanity is usually rooted in their membership in an
oppressed sub-group. 196 Exclusion from full citizenship rights is therefore
188 See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 60, at 746-65.
189 See, e.g., AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE DECENT SOCIETY 135-38, 140-42, 153, 158-61,
167-69 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 1996). Margalit is what I call a "negative" fittingness
theorist, focusing on what conduct we must avoid if we do not wish to insult others. See id.
at 9, 112, 115, 137. Cupit is a "positive" fittingness theorist, focusing on what conduct
respect entitles us to receive. See CUPIT, supra note 180, at 1-12.
190 See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 60, at 746-65, 782-85 (explaining the
importance of serving justice for both individuals and the encompassing salient social groups
with whom they identify, including avoiding the individual and group humiliation so
abhorred by those, like Avishai Margalit, whom I now label "fittingness theorists").
91 See CUPIT, supra note 180, at 66-70, 81-85.
192 See id.
193 See id. at 70-92.
194 See MARGALIT, supra note 189, at 1-4, 84-85, 135-37.
195 See id. at 137-38, 140-42, 153, 158-61, 167-69.
196 Margalit apparently sees humiliation as necessarily aimed at group membership. See
id. at 135-38. I agree that this is one form of humiliation from which we can learn much, but
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humiliating and thus unfitting.197 State-enforced disrespect consequently is
doubly insulting: first, by treating its victims as unworthy of better
treatment in and of themselves; second, by excluding them from full
membership in the polity.
This concept of humiliation has long been recognized by civil rights
law. The Senate Commerce Committee's Report on what eventually
became the Civil Rights Act of 1964 put it this way:
Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the
humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is
told that he is unacceptable as a member of the public because of his race or color. It
is equally the inability to explain to a child that regardless of education, civility,
courtesy, and morality he will be denied the right to enjoy equal treatment, even
though he be a citizen of the United States and may well be called upon to lay down
his life to assure this Nation continues.
198
What is true in statutory civil rights law is true as well of the
constitutional law governing searches and seizures. Racial profiling of
African Americans, for example, humiliates the person stopped, who is
treated as less than fully and equally human because of his membership in a
historically oppressed group. 199 But whites stopped on fabricated motor
vehicle violations to meet ticketing quotas are also insulted. To infringe
upon the right of free movement without adequate reason is to treat a person
as unworthy of having that right, a right necessarily entailed by his simple
humanity. 00
III. PRACTICES, PRINCIPLES, AND HISTORY
I have thus far defined respect as having three aspects: the historical,
the emotional, and the universal. Understanding why all three aspects are
necessary to fully articulate the idea of respect requires exploring the
respective roles of practices, principles, and history in ethical and legal
judgment.
I disagree that it is the only form of humiliation. As Cupit recognizes, unfitting treatment
can occur entirely absent group animus or disparate group impact, for there are innumerable
ways to treat others as less than fully human. See CUPIT, supra note 180, at 13-15. Margalit
recognizes this possibility too but sees a focus on group-biased humiliation as the only
practical way to operationalize his theory. See MARGALIT, supra note 189, at 135-38.
197 See CUPIT, supra note 189, at 80-92; see generally KARST, supra note 65.
198 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 292 (1964) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (quoting Senate Commerce Committee Report, S. REP. No. 88-872, at 16
(1966)).
199 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2257-63
200 For illustrations of the centrality of free movement to human personhood, see id. at
2302-27 (Japanese-American internment and racial profiling as examples of the degrading
effects of unjustified interference with another's free locomotion).
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"Social practices" are current "standards of human behavior
recognized within a community or communities."20 The term "social
practices" is interchangeable with custom, convention, institutions,
tradition, and shared understandings and norms.20 2 "History," in its relevant
sense as used here, instead explores past standards of human behavior
recognized within a community or communities, relying on similar, albeit
older, sources to those used in determining current social practices.0 3
"Principles" are ethical or legal rules concerning what persons or
institutions should do or believe rather than what they in fact do or
believe. 4 Principles can be stated at varying levels of generality.0 5
Law both reflects and shapes social practices, as well as being the
product of current and past understandings of history and its lessons.20 6
Any analysis of what the law is or should be thus requires inquiries into the
201 See MARK TUNICK, PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES: APPROACHES TO ETHICAL AND LEGAL
JUDGMENT 11 (1998).
202 id.
203 See MICHAEL STANFORD, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 11, 16-
17, 45, 62 (1998) (contending that history is based on real past data, including past traditions
and expressions of understandings, but is also necessarily interpretive). The connection
between past practices and the interpretive enterprise of assigning meaning to constitutional
text has been explained by Professor David A. J. Richards:
American constitutionalism should be understood in terms of historically evolving interpretive
practices that aspire to narrative integrity in telling the constitutional story of a people's self-
consciously historical struggle to achieve a politically legitimate government that would
guarantee persons their equal human rights. Constitutional interpretation must make use of
historical argument constructively to articulate the thread of legal texts, principles, and
institutions that constitute over time the struggle for a political community in the genre of
American revolutionary constitutionalism. Such interpretation must use the best available
political theory of human rights to make contextual sense of the ultimate rights-based normative
ends of the constitutional project.
DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, CONSCIENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION: HISTORY, THEORY, AND LAW OF
THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS 17 (1993).
204 See Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 60, at 780 ("The normative impulse views
... text and the history behind it as a source of insight into how others answered similar
questions in the past. Text and history, however, help to illuminate, rather than mandate,
how we should constitute our political community today."); TUNICK, supra note 201, at 9
("[Olur practices can be irrational, unreasonable, or thoroughly evil.... [T]he fact that we
do something is not as strong a reason ... for doing it, as that there are principled reasons for
doing it.").
205 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 10-13 (arguing that principles derived by an
originalist methodology can be stated at varying levels of generality).
206 See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 65 (providing an extended examination
of interaction between law and social practices concerning rape); ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 192-98 (1994)
(arguing that constitutional law is the product of current and past understanding of history
and its lessons).
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existence and nature of relevant history and of current human beliefs and
behavior. Yet some current norms can be morally objectionable.
Widespread eavesdropping as a means of social control in Nazi Germany
was one example.207 History can also be one of domination and insult, as
was true during antebellum slavery and Jim Crow segregation. °8 History
and social practices must thus sometimes be rejected on moral grounds as
inappropriate justifications for a legal rule. As Justice Harlan explained in
his dissent in United States v. White, 209 "[s]ince it is the task of the law to
form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges,
merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability
of saddling them upon society.
210
This section explores the ways in which history and current social
practices should inform the crafting and application of legal rules
articulated pursuant to the authority of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. This section seeks to offer guidance on how the
principle of conducting searches and seizures in ways that enhance human
respect can be given concrete meaning consistent with the highest
aspirations of the American people.
A. SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL PRACTICES ARE BASES FOR INTUITIONS
USEFUL N DEVELOPING AND JUSTIFYING PRINCIPLES
Exploring current social practices can give us information and ideas
that would otherwise escape us in crafting ethical and legal rules. Such
information can spark insights about how to modify and apply principles to
best serve moral or other social goals. In particular, learning from the
experiences and attitudes of the subjugated helps society to see its failings
more clearly. This is the "method of listening, ' '211 which requires decision
makers to move back and forth between hearing the voices of the oppressed
and comparing their experiences and perspectives to current governing
principles:
While everyday discourse about justice certainly makes claims, these are not theorems
to be demonstrated in a self-enclosed system. They are instead calls, pleas, claims
207 See TUNICK, supra note 201, at 159-60, 165 (using similar example).
208 See KARST, supra note 65, at 4.
209 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
210 Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also TUNICK, supra note 201, at 9 (arguing that
moral principles sometimes require rejecting practices); WEST, supra note 206, at 192-98
(arguing that what lessons we learn from the past and whether it binds us is a judgment of
political morality).
211 See MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND
THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION 12 (1998).
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upon some people by others. Rational reflection on justice begins ... in a hearing, in
heeding a call, rather than in asserting and mastering a state of affairs, however
ideal.
2 E
One strategy for effective listening is to hear with the aid of the device
of "subperson-hood." Remember that respect-as-fittingness theorists agree
that all "persons" are entitled to some minimum level of equal treatment
simply by virtue of their humanity.213 But, sometimes overtly, sometimes
covertly, majorities behave in ways that exclude minorities from the
category of full "persons" entitled to equal treatment.214  Physical
"stigmata" such as skin color, an accent, or an odd way of dress trigger a
dominant group's moral blindness, serving as "marks of Cain upon people's
very humanity. ' '215 Bearers of stigmata are "seen as human beings, but as
severely flawed human beings-in other words, as subhuman. 216 Respect
for persons is usually justified by their presumed rationality and
autonomy.217 But subpersons are subconsciously viewed by, or at least
treated by, majorities ("persons") as neither fully rational nor fully capable
of guiding their own destinies.1 8 They are victimized by the "smart
culture" that grades types of humans based upon presumed degrees of
intelligence and self-directedness.2 '9 Persons must pay equal respect to
other persons but owe no such obligation to subpersons 2 ° Subpersons, on
the other hand, owe persons deference and obedience.22'
Kant himself, the founder of the secular version of the idea of human
respect,222 apparently embraced the subpersonhood idea. Thus, in his
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, he saw the
difference between the black and white races of man as so fundamental
regarding mental capacities that "a clear proof that what [a Negro] said was
stupid" was simply that "this fellow was quite black from head to foot.
22 3
212 IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 5 (1990).
213 See supra text accompanying notes 175-200.
214 See CHARLES W. MILLS, BLACKNESS VISIBLE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND RACE 107
(1998).
215 MARGALIT, supra note 189, at 104.
216 Id.
217 See MILLS, supra note 214, at 106-07, 152-55.
211 See id. at 108-09.
219 See ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR., THE SMART CULTURE: SOCIETY, INTELLIGENCE, AND
LAW 1-26 (1998).
220 See MILLS, supra note 214, at 108-09.
221 See id. at 6-7, 108-13, 153-54.
222 See ROGER J. SULLIVAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO KANT'S ETHICS 15-16, 32, 70-71, 76-
77, 140 (1994).
223 IMMANUEL KANT, OBSERVATIONS ON THE FEELING OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME
111-13 (John T. Goldthwait trans., 1960) (1763).
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In Kant's later essay, On the Different Races of Man, he articulated a theory
of racial makeup in which racial heredity also determined intelligence and
the capacities for human development.224  Indeed, the totality of Kant's
work over forty years of lecturing demonstrated his embrace of a "natural
color-coded racial hierarchy" of, from top to bottom, "white Europeans,
yellow Asians, black Africans, and red Americans, with corresponding
differential capacities for moral educability. '25 For Kant, Europeans are
self-starters, Asians cannot grasp abstract concepts, Native Americans are
hopeless, and "Africans can at least be morally educated as slaves and
servants, with the help of a split bamboo cane," which is needed for their
moral education because of "the thickness of their skins. 226 Blacks can
accordingly "be denied full humanity since full and 'true' humanity accrues
only to the white European.,
22 7
While conscious attitudes such as those expressed by Kant can be
illuminating in exploring the subpersonhood idea, they are not necessary.
The central component of the idea is that members of a dominant group
behave as if members of a subordinated group are subhuman.228 The virtue
of the idea is that it makes visible the ways that a society of de jure equality
involves a de facto caste system-one in which limited resources and
mechanisms are made available to enforce antidiscrimination laws,
judicially embraced rights are evaded by narrow constructions of precedent,
continuing cultural and financial hardships from the period of de jure
discrimination are ignored, and the dominant group's perspectives on the
proper interpretation of constitutional provisions prevail.229 Additionally,
the subpersonhood idea exposes the ways in which the abstract, raceless,
colorless persons of Kantian ethics and law are really "concrete, raced,
white persons [who] will . . .relate to another with reciprocal respect as
moral equals" but will not show the same respect toward members of other
224 See Immanuel Kant, On the Different Races of Man, in RACE AND THE
ENLIGHTENMENT: A READER 38-48 (Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze ed., 1997); MILLS, supra note
214, at 73 (characterizing Kant's essay); GEORGE L. MOSSE, TOWARD THE FINAL SOLUTION:
A HISTORY OF EUROPEAN RACISM 31 (1978) (summarizing Kant's essay thusly: "Racial
make-up becomes an unchanging substance and the foundation of all physical appearance
and human development.").
225 MILLS, supra note 214, at 73.
226 Id. at 73-74.
227 Emmanuel C. Eze, The Color of Reason: The Idea of Race in Kant's Anthropology, in
ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE GERMAN ENLIGHTENMENT: PERSPECTIVES ON HUMANITY 200, 221
(Katherine M. Faull ed., 1995).
228 See MARGALIT, supra note 189, at 108-12. Consequently, you can be treated as
subhuman even if your oppressors harbor you no conscious ill will. See id.
229 See MILLS, supra note 214, at 107.
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races.2 30  Furthermore, the social contract can be understood as a racial
contract, one inferred from actual social practices rather than from abstract
theories, a contract in which whites informally agree to categorize non-
whites as having an inferior moral and civil status. 31 In short, the
subpersonhood idea exposes the many ways that our practices fall short of
our publicly stated ideals.
In the Fourth Amendment area, the elements of subpersonhood are
evident everywhere. Consent searches and quality of life policing are used
disproportionately against African Americans.232 How the "reasonable
person" would behave or feel during interactions with the police is in effect
judged from the perspective of the middle-class white person expecting
police protection rather than the poor person familiar with police abuse.233
Police racial animus is deemed irrelevant to Fourth Amendment
reasoning.34 While animus is still relevant to proving a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection violation, the standards of proof even to
obtain discovery in such cases are so high as to render relief highly
unlikely. 35 Poor suspects, again disproportionately racial minorities, rely
on underpaid lawyers in overcrowded courts to uncover police wrongdoing
and combat police abuse.236 Moreover, judicial doctrine leaves the police
substantial discretion regarding their conduct in many areas.237 Police are
exquisitely sensitive to political considerations and understand that the use
of aggressive tactics in middle class white neighborhoods would evoke
widespread outrage.238  The message they receive, according to some
commentators, is that their job is to subdue the rowdier elements of the
underclass while protecting the property of the overclass. 239 "By affording
criminal suspects substantial constitutional protections in theory," however,
"the Supreme Court validates the results of the criminal justice system [in
practice] as fair. 2 40 The costs of the system fall largely on the poor, the
230 Id. at 108 (emphasis omitted).
231 See CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 11 (1997); Taslitz, Contract of
Mutual Indifference, supra note 150, at 1288-1303.
232 See COLE, supra note 37, at 8.
233 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 438-49.
234 See id. at 422-24 (discussing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
235 See id. at 443-45 (discussing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996)).
236 See COLE, supra note 37, at 63-65, 76-95.
237 See generally Maclin, Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 127.
238 See COLE, supra note 37, at 26-27, 54-55.
239 See BOUZA, supra note 130, at 13.
240 COLE, supra note 37, at 8.
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minorities, and the disenfranchised, ensuring continued public support for
crime control measures.241
The subpersonhood idea does more, however, than highlight systemic
inequalities. It is a lens through which stories can be told to build empathy
among receptive members of the majority. That empathy does more than
encourage equal treatment. It enables the dominant group to understand the
true nature of the interests at stake.242 Those aligned with the power of the
majority at one time and place may be its victims under other
circumstances. 243 A legal doctrine protective of the less privileged can in
other circumstances help the more privileged. The interests in privacy,
property, and free movement protected by the Fourth Amendment serve
critical functions in a democratic society.244 Individualized suspicion and
warrant requirements protect those functions.245 A middle class white
person victimized by unjustified warrantless searches and seizures is also
denied his equal humanity. Understanding what behaviors by the state
constitute some as subpersons helps us all better to understand what
practices are needed to define our own full humanity.
Finally, examining history can serve the same moral function as does
studying current social practices in highlighting how we fall short of our
moral ideals. History can also reveal repeating patterns, uncover
intergenerational grievances and depths of feeling, and expose moral
controversies whose resolution led to new law, thus informing moral
sensibilities in a way that a concentration on current social practices alone
246cannot. Constitutional historian and political theorist David Richards,
241 See id. at 8-9, 20-21.
242 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC
LIFE, at xvi, 72-78 (1995) (arguing that stories promote empathy and thus aid the moral
imagination); Taslitz, Contract of Mutual Indifference, supra note 150, at 1362-68 (noting
that a favored abolitionist tactic was telling stories of slave suffering, hoping thereby to
awaken whites' slumbering moral conscience).
243 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2286-88.
244 See Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note I (privacy); Maclin, Right to
Locomotion, supra note 51 (freedom of movement); Yeager, supra note 51 (property).
245 Cf Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147 (arguing Fourth Amendment, properly
understood, promotes an informed and active citizenry); Maclin, Central Meaning, supra
note 102, at 201 ("[T]he central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police
power and discretion," as expressed in the warrant and probable cause requirement.).
246 See DAVID HARLAN, THE DEGRADATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1997) (constituting
an extended argument that one of the primary functions of history is to inform modem moral
judgments); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE":
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000) (providing a superb
illustration of each of the points noted in text on how history adds to what we can learn from
studying current social practices).
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drawing on the teachings of Enlightenment social contract philosopher John
Locke, put the point this way:
Locke had taught ... [Americans] ... that a critical analysis of history could often
clarify the ways in which corrupt abuses of power had subverted the very intellectual,
moral, and political foundations of recognizing, let alone implementing, the
inalienable rights of human nature. Such analysis could afford invaluable historical
instruction in the need for political and constitutional principles protecting against
such corruption.
247
The history of search and seizure practices during slavery and the
incarceration of Japanese-Americans in concentration camps paired with the
seizure of their property during World War II are just two of the most
infamous and familiar examples among many-the implications of which I
have detailed elsewhere-that serve to illuminate the ways in which
"corrupt abuses of power" subvert the recognition and implementation of
the American conception of human rights.248
B. SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL PRACTICES ESTABLISH RELIANCE ON
EXPECTATIONS THAT SHOULD BE FRUSTRATED ONLY FOR
SUBSTANTIAL REASONS
Social practices often create expectations upon which many people
rely. Frustrating those expectations without good reason is unfair. 249 For
example, Americans are comfortable using public restrooms located in
movie theatres, restaurants, or parks.250  That comfort stems from their
expectation that no third parties' eyes will intrude upon the privacy of the
bathroom stall.251 Absent that expectation, some people might, where
nature permitted, postpone the bathroom visit until reaching home, or
preemptively pay such a visit before going to the restaurant or movie
247 David A. J. Richards, Constitutional Liberty, Dignity and Reasonable Justification, in
THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 73, 75 (Michael J.
Meyer & William Parent eds., 1992).
248 See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147 (recounting search and seizure practices
under slavery); Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2302-16
(examining Fourth Amendment implications of the Japanese-American internment). When I
discuss principles here, I need not distinguish between the universalistic concept of respect I
have applied here and an American concept of respect because I believe that both are the
same. However, as I will soon describe, the application of these general principles to
modem America does require an inquiry into distinctly American historical and current
social practices. See infra Part IlI.C; cf. RiCHARD H. KING, CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE IDEA OF
FREEDOM (1992) (arguing that the history of the Civil Rights Movement shows that it was
part of a larger struggle for African American self-respect).
249 See TUNICK, supra note 201, at 155-58.
250 See id. at 156.
251 See id.
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theatre, or reduce or eliminate their public activities altogether, whenever
possible. Frustration of this expectation is certainly perceived as an
invasion of our humanity: "If one wants to find assured privacy in our
culture, one flees to the bathroom . . . . [I]t symbolizes utmost privacy.
Intrusion into the bathroom symbolizes violation of the private sphere of the
person. '25 2  For this reason, many courts have repeatedly declared it
impermissible for officers to peer into closed stalls.
253
In another example, the United States Supreme Court recently held
that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat emanating
from his home.254 Accordingly, the Court held that police use of a thermal
imaging device to detect high levels of heat-which are often associated
with the use of high-intensity lamps to grow marijuana--constituted a
search, thereby requiring compliance with the Fourth Amendment. The
Court grounded its decision in a newly articulated principle. This principle
recognized a reasonable privacy expectation whenever police use
technology that is "not in general public use" to "explore details of [a]
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion .... This principle seems rooted in the idea that the Court
should not easily countenance violation of settled expectations.256
252 CARL D. SCHNEIDER, SHAME, ExpoSURE, AND PRIVACY 72 (1977); cf Robert C.
Power, Technology and the Fourth Amendment: A Proposed Formulation for Visual
Searches, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 89 (1989) ("[O]ur society demands privacy for
evacuation and nudity.").
253 See, e.g., Britt v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County, 374 P.2d 817 (Cal. 1962); Ward v.
State, 636 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); Brown v. State, 238 A.2d 147 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1968); State v. Bryant, 177 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 1970). But see United States v.
Billings, 858 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1988) (officer's looking through the gap between the floor
and bottom of the stall door upheld); Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965)
(park worker's looking through a ceiling hole into a public restroom stall upheld).
254 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
255 Id. at 40.
256 The Court's position can fairly be read as this: At the time of the framing, obtaining
any information regarding activities taking place within the home would have been
considered a search. See id. at 34 ("This [holding] assures preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted."). That
expectation continues today, its power and depth demonstrated by its long historical roots.
See id. ("[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes-the prototypical . . . area of
protected privacy-there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the
minimal expectation of privacy that exists .... ). There was, in the Court's view, no good
reason to violate this settled expectation. See id. ("To withdraw protection of this minimum




A distinction must be made among what degree of privacy people
want, what they expect, and what they believe they have a right to expect.
25 7
The Court often adopts rules inconsistent with, and eschews serious
examination of, most people's expectations or desires about their privacy.2
Thus there is at least some empirical support for believing that most
Americans place a significantly higher weight on their privacy interests in
their bank accounts and their conversations with trusted employees, such as
secretaries and chauffeurs, than does the Court.25 9  The Court finds no
reasonable privacy expectation in bank account information or
conversations with third parties-even trusted ones-who may turn out to
be undercover police agents.260
History can shed light both on the depth of current social expectations
and whether a sense of their right to continuance is likely to persist in the
face of contrary government action. 26' American culture has long had as
one of its defining features a commitment to mobility. 62 Geographical
mobility-the right to move for a better job or a different lifestyle, to drive
to visit nearby friends, to obtain better medical care or access to a better
school system-is closely linked to Americans' sense of their entitlement to
struggle for social and economic mobility.263 The institution of a national
pass system to move or drive from one county to another would therefore
engender massive coercion to achieve compliance.26
Expectations both about how things are and how they should be can
vary among groups. Relatively few middle class whites expect to be
stopped and questioned on the street. For young black males of all social
classes, however, the opposite expectation may hold.265 Yet these same
257 See TUNICK, supra note 201, at 153-54.
258 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society", 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) (finding some wide
differences between public's and the Court's designation of activities in which privacy is
seen as reasonably expected).
259 See id. at 740-41.
260 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 116-20 (summarizing case law).
261 See supra note 256 (illustrating this point in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27
(2001)).
262 See generally JAMES J. JASPER, RESTLESS NATION: STARTING OVER IN AMERICA (2000)
(providing book-length defense of this point); JOHN HARMON MCELROY, AMERICAN BELIEFS:
WHAT KEEPS A BIG COUNTRY AND A DIVERSE PEOPLE UNITED 60-92 (1999) (similar chapter-
length defense).
263 See sources cited supra note 262.
264 See TUNICK, supra note 201, at 197 ("[S]ome existing understandings are so
entrenched that to implement radically different practices would require massive coercion.").
265 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 438-39.
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black males may be incensed by such stops, believing that they have a right
to expect more. The degree of insult they feel is informed by their
understanding of the history of slavery, Jim Crow laws, and modem
institutional discrimination, as well as by current life experience.266
Edmund Burke captured well the sense of unfairness that stems from
inadequately justified violations of expectations:
When men are encouraged to go into a certain mode of life by the existing laws, and
protected in that mode as a lawful occupation-when they have accommodated all
their ideas, and all their habits to it-when the law had long made their adherence to
its rules a ground of reputation, and their departure from them a ground of disgrace
and even of penalty-I am sure it is unjust in legislature, by an arbitrary act, to offer a
sudden violence to their minds and to their feelings; forcibly to degrade them from
their state and condition, and to stigmatize with shame and infamy that character and
those customs which before had been made the measure of their happiness and
honour.
267
Here Burke is talking about frustrating expectations of what is rather
than what should be. But his ruminations are equally applicable to the latter
context. Whites expect to move freely about city streets unmolested by the
police. For this very reason, blacks believe that they too should be similarly
treated, though they expect otherwise.2 68 Nevertheless, if they are stopped
without cause, they feel degraded and stigmatized "with shame and infamy"
by an "arbitrary act... [doing] sudden violence to their minds and... their
feelings.
'2 69
C. SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL PRACTICES DEFINE WHAT "TREATMENT"
IS ILL-FITTING
1. Hard-to-Determine Social Meanings a'nd Unfit Treatment
Respect for others, I have explained, requires treating them
consistently with their status as human beings. But when does "treatment"
266 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 156-66
(discussing profiling); see generally GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY (2002) (discussing historical and social-psychological roots of black
stigmatization in American society); DEBORAH MATHIS, YET A STRANGER: WHY BLACK
AMERICANS STILL DON'T FEEL AT HOME (2002) (discussing causes and examples of black
awareness of continuing racial stigmatization and white blindness to the same phenomenon).
267 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 328 (J.C.D. Clark ed.,
Stanford Univ. Press 2001) (1790).
268 See supra note 62 and accompanying text (reviewing empirical data on African
American conceptions of the police); Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect,
supra note 1, at 134-43 (discussing African American attitudes toward, and meaning of
flight from, the police).
269 See BURKE, supra note 267, at 171.
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meet this test? Whether treatment is disrespectful or not turns on the
action's meaning. But this meaning
need not coincide with what an observer of the action happens to infer from the
action, nor with the actual beliefs of the actor. The meaning of what we do, like the
meaning of what we say, is to be distinguished from what our hearers infer, and from
our own beliefs. If I treat you as untrustworthy when you are not, I ma do you an
injustice even if it is the case that I do not believe you to be untrustworthy.
This does not mean that actual beliefs are irrelevant. When both the actor
and the recipient consciously understand an action as demeaning, that is
generally a fair way to understand the act.27'
The harder case occurs when the actor intends no insult, but the
recipient perceives one. In such a situation, judges must choose one
person's meaning over another person's understanding. A still harder case
arises when neither the actor nor the recipient consciously perceives an
insult but most of society does. Alternatively, neither the parties nor
society as a whole may perceive an insult, but some social sub-group does.
Again, judges must choose whose meaning controls.
Making this choice requires understanding the two different harms of
stigmatizing actions: first, they assault each person's self-respect; second,
they brand each such individual with a sign of her inferiority and outcast
status to others.272 Both harms, as relevant here, commonly stem from the
message that the person's unworthiness is rooted in her membership in a
degraded social group. Because the individual is stigmatized for belonging
to the group, an insulting action directed at the individual will be perceived
by other group members as also degrading them. Other group members,
who are not the immediate object of the insulting action, thus experience it
as also degrading them.273 Comprehending the nature of both harms
therefore necessitates exploring social practices, both those widely shared in
society and those instead characteristic primarily of the subordinate or the
dominant groups involved. That exploration will also shed light on the
likely understandings of the particular individuals involved. Nevertheless,
looking to social and sub-group attitudes still does not tell us which
understandings should govern where they conflict.
270 CUPIT, supra note 180, at 15.
271 See, e.g., Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 60, at 758-65 (describing why
intentional infliction of bodily harm motivated by racist reasons is best understood as
creating a group-subordinating message that is an independent harm from any bodily pain or
injury).
272 See Charles R. Lawrence, I1, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 351 (1987).
273 Cf Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 60 (making similar point in the context of
hate crimes).
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2. Subconscious Meanings As Part of a Possible Solution
One possible solution is to look to subconscious meanings. Indeed,
there is a growing literature that establishes that racial, gender, and ethnic
bias often operate at the subconscious level.274 People who ardently believe
in racial equality may still consistently behave in ways that devalue
members of certain races. For example, there is much evidence that juries
are more likely to impose the death penalty where crime victims are white
than where they are black. 75  Randall Kennedy calls this phenomenon
"racially selective empathy": "the unconscious failure to extend to [blacks]
the same recognition of humanity, and hence the same sympathy and care,
given as a matter of course to [whites]."276
The same well-meaning egalitarians may make decisions based upon
biased prototypes, such as believing that only certain types of men are
likely to rape or that black men are dangerous.277 Like devaluation,
prototypical reasoning can proceed at the subconscious level, based upon
deeply engrained stereotypes.278 Because such stereotypes can operate
subconsciously, and in a fashion directly opposing an actor's conscious
beliefs, it is particularly difficult to identify the mental process at work or to
correct it. Yet, it continues to manifest itself in behavior that stigmatizes
subordinate groups and deprives them of equal access to political,
economic, and symbolic resources. 79
That stigmatization arises from the culture's widespread understanding
of the action's meaning, even if that understanding is subconscious. 280 An
action's meaning derives from this long-term, pervasive association with
certain thoughts or feelings. 28  That association leads to the internalization
274 See, e.g., JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE
HIDDEN COST OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA (1997); AARON T. BECK, M.D., PRISONERS OF
HATE: THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF ANGER, HOSTILITY, AND VIOLENCE (1999); Martha
Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Deevaluation and Biased
Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747 (2001); TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 65.
275 See Chamallas, supra note 274, at 761.
276 Randall L. Kennedy, McKlesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1420 (1988) (citing Paul Brest, The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 7-8 (1976) (citations omitted)).
277 See Chamallas, supra note 274, at 778-89.
278 See id.
279 See id.; ARMOUR, supra note 274, at 68-77.
280 See Lawrence, supra note 272, at 324 (making this point); ROBERT E. HASKELL,
BETWEEN THE LINES: UNCONSCIOUS MEANING IN EVERYDAY CONVERSATION 205-30 (1999)
(describing psychological processes at work for conveying racist stigma in everyday
conversation).
281 See Lawrence, supra note 272, at 363.
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of the thoughts or feelings. 28 2  If that internalization is sufficiently
widespread, it will become expressed in a system of social symbols or
meanings not easily changed by civil rights laws.28 3 "The feelings may be
repressed from consciousness, but so long as the symbols they have created
retain their meaning, the feelings continue to exist and to shape
behavior.,
28 4
Obstacles to proving the existence of stigmatizing meanings based on
subconscious processes will be large. Dominant groups may sincerely and
righteously deny that such processes are at work.28 5 Alternative plausible
explanations to stereotypical thinking may be offered. Stereotypes may be
acknowledged but claimed to be supported by empirical evidence, with any
stigmatized meaning denied. Thus, an officer may question more young,
African American males than white males about purchasing crack cocaine,
arguing that crack use is much higher among the former group than the
latter.28 6 Finally, apart from any problem of proof, it may genuinely be the
case that the conscious or subconscious understandings at work may differ
between dominant and subordinate groups or may be so diverse as to deny
categorization of any shared understanding whatsoever.8 7
Professor Charles Lawrence has proposed circumventing the proof
problem by approaching the quest for cultural meaning as an act of
interpretation of human behavior as a social text, that is, studying people in
much the same way that a literary critic studies great novels.288 Meanings
do not exist "out there" as some objectively definable fact about the
physical world, such as whether the color of a traffic light was red or green
when a car entered an intersection. Meanings are plausible constructions
289crafted from social context, values, debate, and common sense. Social
scientists frequently engage in such interpretive enterprises concerning




285 See ARMOUR, supra note 274, at 119-53 (describing this process at work concerning
the unconscious impact of race at trials); Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I, supra note 178, at
404-33 (describing psychological processes that lead even feminist jurors to routinely acquit
alleged rapists).
286 Professor Jody Armour describes this sort of argument as made by the "intelligent
Bayesian racist." See ARMOUR, supra note 274, at 35-60.
287 See supra note 62 (summarizing data on majority versus minority attitudes toward the
police as an illustration).
288 See LAWRENCE, supra note 272, at 334.
289 See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence:
Foundations, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 12-25 (1998) [hereinafter Taslitz, Feminist
Approach].
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hermeneutics. "Surface" hermeneutics refers to a person's or group's overt
messages. 290  "Depth" hermeneutics refers to concealed messages.
Messages may be concealed because: we are unaware of all the messages
that we send, we seek to "pretty them up," we give oversimplified accounts,
or we do not trust the observer.291 Thus the combination of male lawyers
sexually harassing female lawyers in the same firm, frequently mistaking
them for secretaries, and turning social events with them into beer-drinking
and sports trivia contests was most plausibly understood by one social
scientist as sending the "deep" message: "We have higher social status than
you; you must, therefore, not try to rise above your station., 292 This same
sort of hermeneutic reasoning can be applied to broader cultural institutions.
3. Plessy and Brown: Struggling to Choose Which Group's Meaning
Prevails
Professor Lawrence's interpretive turn has much to commend it, both
standing on its own and as a supplement to social scientific empirical and
theoretical work on the subconscious, such interpretation being helpful in
identifying the fairly understood meanings of allegedly insulting actions.
Yet he concedes that where meanings given to the same action are diverse
among subgroups, it is easiest simply to declare that no one group's view
prevails, rather than choosing which among the competing interpretations
293dominates. By default, the law cannot then treat a challenged action as
stigmatizing where only one subgroup finds it so.
More recently, Professors Tom Tyler and John Darley have similarly
declared that where disadvantaged minorities and middle class whites
disagree over the question of how intrusive of privacy a police search or
seizure is, "it would be problematic to bring the law into line with the
values of one group, as opposed to another. 294 They offer no explanation
for this conclusion, however, apparently seeing it as self-evident. I disagree
with this refusal to choose. Examining the high Court's decisions in Plessy
290 See id. at 67 (citing PAUL DIESING, HOW DOES SOCIAL SCIENCE WORK? 29-54 (1991)).
291 See id.
292 See JENNIFER L. PIERCE, GENDER TRIALS: EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPORARY LAW
FIRMS 17-22, 106-39, 176-87 (1995); Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 289, at 66-67
(summarizing Pierce's work).
293 See Lawrence, supra note 272, at 379 (arguing that where governmental action may
be given different meanings by different subcultures, the action should be viewed as racially
discriminatory "only when the evidence indicates that the racial understanding will be
widely shared within the predominant culture," not simply in the subordinate culture).
294 Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public
Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities Into Account When
Formulating Substantive Law, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 707, 727-28 (2000).
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v. Ferguson295 and Brown v. Board of Education296 lays the groundwork for
explaining why.
In Plessy, decided during May 1896, the Supreme Court upheld
against Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges Louisiana's law
requiring non-streetcar railroad lines to provide "equal but separate
accommodations for the white and colored races." Albion Tourgee, Homer
Plessy's lead counsel,297 expressly addressed the law's stigmatizing
meaning in his brief to the Court on Plessy's behalf:
[A] discrimination intended to humiliate or degrade one race in order to promote the
pride of ascendancy in another, is not made a "police regulation" by insisting that the
one will not be entirely happy unless the other is shut out of their presence. Haman
was troubled with the same sort of unhappiness because he saw Mordecai the Jew
sitting at the Kings gate. He wanted a "police regulation" to prevent his being
contaminated by the sight. He did not set out the real cause of his zeal for the public
welfare: neither does this statute. He wanted to "down" the Jew: this act is intended
to "keep the Negro in his place." The exemption of nurses shows that the real evil lies
not in the color of the skin, but in the relation the colored person sustains to the white.
If he is a dependent, he may be endured: if he is not, his presence is
insufferable ....
Justice Henry Billings Brown, writing for the Court majority, squarely
rejected Tourgee' s argument:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with
a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but
solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.
299
Justice Brown's response may simply be mendacious, the stigmatizing
intent of the law being quite clear to him.300 Alternatively, he may be self-
295 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
296 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
297 See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 113 (1992).
298 Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 19, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210),
reprinted in 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 46 (Phillip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975). See
also KULL, supra note 297, at 120 (discussing the Tourgee brief).
299 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 393 (1880), the Court
had earlier struck down a state law excluding blacks "from legal society." Plessy arguably
did not retreat from that principle but relied on the dubious psychological and sociological
minor premise that segregation did not carry such an implication. See Charles Black, The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. J. 421, 422 (1960) (first making this
point); ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW & SOCIAL EQUALITY 57-76 (1996)
(amplifying this point and exploring its implications).
300 Whether conceding his own dishonesty or merely gaining understanding with the
hindsight offered by age, Justice Brown did later note that Plessy dissenter Justice Harlan
"assumed what is probably the fact, that the statute had its origin in the purpose, not so much
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deluding, the dishonoring meaning operating for him and perhaps many of
Louisiana's whites at a less-than-conscious level. Indeed, a racist might
easily deny such intent to himself, reasoning that no law is necessary to
degrade a self-evidently inferior race. Another possibility is that Justice
Brown was a poor hermeneuticist, not understanding the meaning widely
shared among Louisianans. The express text of his opinion offers a
different explanation: his belief that even if the "colored race" felt
stigmatized, their feelings were irrelevant.30'
Some sixty years later, in Brown v. Board of Education, °2 the Court
adopted a very different view of the role of group stigma. There, the Court
unanimously held that forced segregation of black and white public school
children violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
assumed that all "tangible" factors-buildings, curricula, teacher salaries-
were equal or being equalized in both black and white classrooms.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the law's sanctioning of racial
segregation was "usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro
group. 30 3  In particular, the Court relied on social science studies
supporting the Kansas trial court's findings that segregation had a
detrimental impact on the educational and mental development of black
children.3 °4  This detrimental impact stemmed from black pupils'
segregation "generat[ing in them] a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community. 30 5
to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people
from coaches occupied [by] or assigned to white persons." H.B. Brown, The Dissenting
Opinions ofMr. Justice Harlan, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 321, 338 (1912).
301 Justice Brown's reasoning is ambiguous, perhaps intentionally so, in yet another way.
His language may be read as denying that the Act was intended to stigmatize African
Americans by reason of their skin color. But his language may also be read as not so much
denying this intention as ignoring any ill effects it has on the African American community
or its individual members. "No one can make you feel inferior but yourself' seems to be the
message. The blame, if any, for harm resulting from the Act therefore falls on the weakness
or foolishness of "the colored race," who impose on themselves the "badge of inferiority."
The blameworthy merit no compassion, and their perspective, experiences, and feelings may
therefore be ignored, Brown seems implicitly to say, seemingly unaware of, or unwilling
candidly to recognize, the reality that even an expression of indifference toward another
group is in itself stigmatizing. See Taslitz, Contract of Mutual Indifference, supra note 150,
at 1284-1303 (explaining the role of majority indifference in subordinating minority status).
302 347 U.S. 483.
303 Id. at 494 (quoting the Kansas case trial court).
304 See id. at 494 n. 11; KULL, supra note 297, at 154 (so interpreting Brown).
305 347 U.S. at 494.
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Brown's reasoning is notoriously sparse and ambiguous.3 6 The
Court's opinion never openly suggested that the segregation laws were
intended to stigmatize black children. Rather, the Court emphasized
blacks' own perception of a stigmatizing message.0 7 That perception was
not always a conscious one. Thus, the Court cited studies by Professor
Kenneth Clark in which black children were more likely to choose a white
doll than a black doll as "'nice' or 'good.' 30 8  That arguably suggests a
feeling of race-based inferiority, but it is unlikely that these children
consciously articulated this message to themselves.
Brown does contain some language that could be interpreted as the
Court relying upon the stigmatizing messages most plausibly sent by state-
imposed segregation rather than upon whether these messages were in fact
intended or received.3 0 9 But this language pales in comparison to the
306 See KULL, supra note 297, at 154 (defending this point). See also WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter WHAT
BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID], where leading academic commentators each take a stab at
writing a more complete and persuasive version of the Brown opinion.
307 Thus the Court relied in part on its precedent in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950), which required a black student admitted to a white graduate school to
be treated like all other students because otherwise "his ability to study, to engage in
discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession"
would be hampered. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (quoting McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641).
Similarly, in the case before the Court, segregation of public school children based on race
might, because of the sense of inferior status that it generates in the children, "affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Id. at 494. Similarly, the trial court
finding in the Kansas case, upon which the Supreme Court partly relied, declared that
segregation "has a detrimental impact upon the colored children," resulting in a sense of
inferiority that "affects the motivation of a child to learn" and "has a tendency to [retard] the
educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racially integrated system." Id. (quoting Kansas trial court
finding). In short, and in direct contradiction to Plessy, the Brown Court stressed the
interpretation made of segregation by its victims and the resulting ill effects on them.
308 See JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 43-44 (2001) (describing Kenneth Clark's research).
The Court also relied on other social scientists' work supporting conclusions similar to
Clark's. See id. at 67-69; Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.l 1. Whether Clark's studies embodied
quality social science is irrelevant to my purpose here: to examine whether the Court's use of
those studies constituted a judicial embrace of the meaning given to legal segregation by the
subordinate group.
309 For example, the Court emphasized that today education "is the very foundation of
good citizenship" and "a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment." Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. Taken in isolation, this language could be read to
support an equality principle divorced from the meanings that African Americans gave to the
practice of segregation. The argument would be that "good citizens" must work and live
together with all racial groups, that such racial comity must be part of a normal environment,
and that the state must send a message-regardless of its impact on anyone (though we hope
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Court's emphasis on the actual feelings of the black children. The Court
may, therefore, have sided with the meaning perceived by the subordinate
group, finding the dominant group's psychological processes irrelevant, a
precise inversion of the position of Justice Brown in Plessy.
If this is so, the Court offers no justification for privileging the black
community's perceptions, and it was certainly not self-evident to all whites
at the time why this should be so. 3 10  Moreover, if later social science
showed black children to have strong self-esteem, performing well
academically despite forced racial segregation, the opinion's rationale
would be undermined.31' Similarly, if the black community became so
fiercely nationalistic as to prefer racial separation, even to ask for it, so that
they perceived no insult in legal segregation-an admittedly unlikely
event-that too would undermine the opinion.
But there is another way to understand Brown that can both justify
privileging black perspectives while simultaneously not solely relying on
those perspectives to generate meaning. That way, also relevant to the
search and seizure issues that this article addresses, begins with the Fourth
Amendment's declaration that it is the right of "the people" to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.312
that it has a positive impact on all groups)-that treating persons of all races as equally
belonging to the same overarching group, namely, "Americans," is central to our national
cultural values. In short, this interpretation would prohibit racial segregation in education as
a matter of political morality. Something like that approach is indeed apparently what really
animated the Court's decision. See KULL, supra note 297, at 155. See also Jack M. Balkin,
Rewriting Brown, in WHAT BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 306, at 50-53
(describing several commentators trying to rewrite Brown to adopt a position more explicitly
turning on educational segregation's "social meaning" rather than arguing that Brown itself
did so and without offering a complete theory of a social meaning stance or its Fourth
Amendment implications).
310 See PATTERSON, supra note 308, at 86-117 (describing white reaction in the aftermath
of Brown).
311 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 299, at 61-62 (arguing that although discrimination does
hurt the self-esteem of some blacks, the "most thorough aggregate studies of self concept
among blacks [today] have found that 'personal self-esteem among black populations [is]
either equal to or greater than that among whites') (quoting Judith R. Porter & Robert E.
Washington, Black Identity and Self-Esteem: A Review of Studies in Black Self-Concept,
1968-1978, 5 ANN. REV. Soc. 53, 62 (1979)). Koppelman goes on to note, however, that
blacks may still suffer a different sort of injury: resentment, tension, anger, distraction from
valuable pursuits, and a drain on time and energy. Id. at 62. Koppelman agrees as well that
many blacks perceive the insult in racial discrimination even if that understanding does not
necessarily translate into resulting psychological harm.
312 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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4. Defining "Peoplehood"As the Solution
a. Peoplehood Defined
Numerous definitions have been offered of what it means to be a
"people. 31 3 Liberals traditionally tend toward a relatively shallow notion
of individuals associating for narrow and wholly instrumental reasons, such
as safeguarding property and overseeing the market.31 4 Communitarians
define peoplehood by a deeper set of shared beliefs, interests, and values,
something hard to find in so diverse a place as the United States.3 I5 The
liberal conception effectively denies the reality of peoplehood entirely,
viewing it as a useful fiction.31 6 The communitarian conception requires a
considerable degree of homogeneity and like-mindedness that may unduly
undermine individual autonomy.317
A more appealing conception has recently been articulated by Jed
Rubenfeld. He defines a people as individuals' "co-existence, over time,
under the rule of a given legal and political order., 318 An analogy to the
problem of individual identity clarifies the significance of Rubenfeld's
stress on the element of time. A person who is ten years old today will, in
twenty years, have different attitudes, beliefs, goals, and desires. He may
have fewer organs, such as the removal of his gall bladder, may be fatter or
thinner, more or less energetic. Even at the molecular level, the precise
molecules constituting his body will have changed. Yet he and others will
still think of him as the same person, as "Hank Jones" and not suddenly
"Clay Smith.
3 19
What explains this sense of individual continuity is the narrative
coherence of human lives. We each tell ourselves stories that link together
313 See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 45-48 (2001).
314 See id. at 148.
"' See id. at 149-50 ("[L]inguo-nationalists" hold that "in order to be a people, [persons]
have to share a common way of looking at the world and at themselves, a shared set of
values, attitudes, understandings, and interests."). The danger in such a vision, of course, is
that it promotes homogeneity, "liberalism's dystopia." Id. at 150-51. But see R.A. DUFF,
PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 42-56 (2001) (arguing that the boundaries
are blurring between liberalism and communitarianism so that it is now possible to speak of
communitarian-liberals or liberal communitarians).
316 See RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 145-49.
317 See id. at 148-51. I exclude from this criticism those communitarian theorists who
have fused their ideas with liberal insights. See DUFF, supra note 315, at 42-60.
318 RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 153 (emphasis added).
319 See id. at 131-42 (making similar point).
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the different phases of our lives.320 Our sense of self largely consists of
these stories.321 "Our plannings, our rememberings, even our loving and
hating, are guided by narrative plots. 32 2  Narratives, of course, move
through time, having a beginning, middle, and an end.323 One cannot,
therefore, be a person at a single moment in time.3 24 To be a person is to be
the combination of what you were, are, and will be.325 The narrative nature
of personhood does not make it a fiction. The narrative is who you are.326
So it is with "a people." Although the precise persons constituting a
people change through death, birth, immigration, and emigration, the people
live on. Although the goals, activities, and beliefs of people change, we are
still the American people. We are defined by the story of our past, present,
and future.327
Yet this move from the individual to the people seemingly raises
problems. Diversity among members of a nation means that many stories
will abound. Even where there is agreement over events and action, there
will be disagreement over their interpretation.32 8 In what sense is there a
320 See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra note 289, at 34-46.
321 See id.; JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE, LIFE 63-89 (2002)
(discussing the narrative creation of the self).
322 See Theodore R. Sarbin, The Narrative as a Root Metaphor for Psychology, in
NARRATIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE STORIED NATURE OF HUMAN CONDUCT 3, 11 (Theodore R.
Sarbin ed., 1986).
323 RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 137; accord BRUNER, supra note 321, at 15 ("[W]e
know that narrative in all its forms is a dialectic between what was expected and what came
to pass.").
324 See RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 137.
325 Id.
326 See id. Nor does this mean that the narrative can be based on fictions. Though our
memories are partly constructed, we do try to create a coherent sense of self-an
interpretation of who we are-based on our best beliefs about our own experiences as "out
there" facts, such as whether we had a dog as a child, what persons attended our Bar-
Mitzvah, and what our grades were like in school. See Taslitz, Feminist Approach, supra
note 289, at 5-6, 12-34 (distinguishing between "out there" facts and interpretive facts). The
same sort of analysis is true with "peoplehood": it is defined by a narrative moving over time
but is not therefore a fiction. See infra Part III.C.4.
327 See RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 148-59. Two further distinctions should be noted.
First, Rubenfeld is discussing what makes "a people," not any particular people. Id. at 152.
Thus a shared collective narrative is necessary for any people to exist, but the specific
narrative told, and even some widely shared qualities and beliefs, might define the
"American people." See id. at 153. Second, Rubenfeld believes that his observations about
peoplehood have implications for interpreting all constitutional provisions. See id. at 178-
95. Nevertheless, his arguments seem even more apt in the context of a constitutional
provision like the Fourth Amendment that explicitly refers to the right of "the people."
328 See, e.g., Taslitz, Contract of Mutual Indifference, supra note 150, at 1316-28
(recounting differing interpretations of slavery's meaning between the antebellum, through
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common story that unites us as a people? The answer to this question lies
in the second part of Rubenfeld's definition of peoplehood: living under the
rule of a given legal and political order.
The precise rules of such an order, of course, change over time. What
makes it the same legal and political order is a shared set of
commitments.3 29
Again, an analogy to individual personhood is helpful. A commitment
is an enduring normative determination made in the past to govern the
future.330 Commitments give purpose and direction to our lives. Each of us
has numerous commitments. Some are initially chosen, while others can at
first be imposed on us by circumstances, as happens when we are born into
a family.331 "To be a son, in the normative sense ... is to be committed to
certain familial values, to find important aspects of my good in the life and
flourishing of this family, to recognize certain obligations to other members
of the family.
' 3 2
This son may, out of thoughtlessness or limited abilities, fail fully to
honor his commitments to his family. If they are still his commitments,
however, he will feel guilty about his failures and try to do better next time.
But this last point reveals an unusual aspect of commitments: they must be
open to constant reflection and occasional change. Their normative force
stems from our sense that they are chosen, helping to define us. If we
cannot re-evaluate the wisdom of our commitments and accordingly change
them, they are no longer chosen, thus no longer ours.333 On the other hand,
if our commitments change too readily, they are no longer enduring,
becoming momentary preferences rather than commitments at all.334
To make a commitment does not mean to understand all that the
commitment entails. Our understanding of what our commitments require
necessarily changes over time. 335 The son does not really know what it
fully means to be a son until he must care for an aging parent. Indeed that
aspect of "son-hood" may never have previously crossed the son's mind.
immediate post-Civil War, South and North).
329 See RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 154-58. Rubenfeld initially declares that he
cannot precisely define "rule" under the same "order" but then describes its characteristics as
including the temporal extension of shared commitments. See id. at 154-56.
330 See id. at 92.
331 See id. at 91-102.
332 DUFF, supra note 315, at 50.
333 See RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 96-100.
334 See id. at 96, 100.
331 See id. at 95. Rubenfeld writes that the committed person is "entrained in the task of
working out the implications and possibilities of certain engagements he already has with the
world." Id. at 95.
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A legal and political order consists of a people's commitments. As
with the son, a people's commitments must endure but may change. And,
as with the son, what a people's commitments require may only be realized
over time.336
Diversity among individuals does not preclude this shared
commitment. Commitments can be shared by persons who radically
disagree about their meaning in one circumstance versus another.337  If
enough individuals are prepared to live under institutions embodying shared
legal and political commitments, it is fair to consider them a people despite
their interpretive disagreements.33 8
Constitutionalism in a democracy is therefore a people's struggle over
time to craft and live out its most fundamental commitments, even if they
are contrary to the popular will at a given moment in time.339
Understanding the meaning of a constitutional provision therefore requires
exploring both its relevant history and salient current social practices.340
Importantly, commitments derive from passion. Our most important
constitutional commitments indeed tend to be enacted "not in moments of
336 See id. at 54-58.
337 See id. at 156.
338 See id. This definition of peoplehood thus reconciles commonality with diversity.
See id. at 158 ("To recognize a people as a subject persisting over time, despite the
heterogeneity of its composition, is ultimately no more mystical than recognizing individuals
as subjects persisting over time despite the heterogeneity of their composition.").
319 See id. at 183-84. Cf ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM:
RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1-40, 192-98 (1994) (arguing that history
matters to help to inform us how we shall constitute ourselves as a people today); DUFF,
supra note 315, at 59, 69 (arguing that the "common law" is a phrase best understood not as
judge-made law but as law that "embodies the shared values and normative understandings
of the community," meaning the shared commitments to certain political values). In an
analogous argument, Professor George Fletcher argues that the Reconstruction Amendments
embodied a recognition that we had moved from being a loose collection of individuals at
the founding to being an "organic nation." See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET
CONSTITUTION: How LINCOLN REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 57-74 (2001). Rubenfeld
would likely argue that we were always one people (Fletcher is inconsistent but seems to use
the terms "people" and "nation" interchangeably, see id. at 73), whether we realized it or not,
because we are defined by who we are, were, and will be. See RUBENFELD, supra note 313,
at 56-73, 80-88, 158. Both scholars would agree, however, that our current sense of political
commitment requires exploring our past, particularly the changes wrought by slavery and
Reconstruction. See FLETCHER, supra, at 33 ("[A] practice can be become part of the
accumulated historical constitution without this being the purpose of those who initiated the
practice," as Lincoln's Gettysburg address has become "the preamble to a new order of
nationhood, equality, and democracy .... ); RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 80, 199 ("In
any particular nation, this we will have been the product of a history, a constitutional
struggle, usually waged at the cost of considerable blood and fortune," as is illustrated by the
paradigm case of the struggle against the post-Civil War black codes).
340 See RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 56-73, 80-88, 158.
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sober rationality but rather of high politicalfeeling. . . ,,141 This passion is
part of what unites us over time. Commitmentarianism "captures the
sometimes superior claim of feeling over reason-of an enduring normative
passion over day-to-day rationality.
' 342
Furthermore, the members of a people, like the members of a family,
owe obligations to one another.343 These obligations arise from the
people's shared commitments. The political-legal order helps both to
express those commitments and to encourage members to fulfill the
obligations that they accordingly owe each other.344
b. Implications for Meaning-Making
Now we are in a position to answer the two questions raised by Brown
v. Board of Education:345 Why privilege one group's meaning concerning
respectful treatment over another's, and can appropriate meaning be derived
without necessarily resorting solely to proof of the respective group
members' subjective mental states?
346
341 Id. at 129 (emphasis in original).
342 Id. at 94.
343 Cf DUFF, supra note 315, at 46-48 (describing how members of a liberal political
community share obligations to one another, including the duty to respect and encourage
diversity); KOPPELMAN, supra note 299, at 70 ("Where stigma exists, there is already
community-and therefore communal obligations.").
344 See sources cited supra note 343.
34' 347 U.S. 483. See supra text accompanying notes 296-312 (discussing Brown's
importance to this article's thesis).
346 My repeated reference to "one group's views" versus "another group's views" or to
an "African American" or "Asian-American" perspective will meet the obvious and all too-
familiar objection of essentialism.
I offer several responses. First, how we define each group when addressing particular
legal questions is important. Thus, "low-income, young African American males" may (or
may not) have very different views on a particular issue from "high income, older African
American women." If so, to speak of an "African American perspective" is misleading. But
sub-group definition then requires us to offer justifications for why we might, for example,
privilege the younger males' views over the older women's. Other times, group sub-division
may make no sense at all.
Second, of course there will be a diversity of views within any group, however
defined. But that does not prevent our fairly concluding either that a majority of that group's
members hold a certain belief, or, alternatively, that the members of one group are more
likely than the members of another group to hold that belief. See MELISSA S. WILLIAMS,
VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY: MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL
REPRESENTATION 5-6 (1998).
Indeed, it would be odd, given the different life experiences of many members of one
group from those of another, if there were no on-average differences in perspective. See id.;
ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 18 (1997). Those claiming no link between group
membership and the likelihood of holding certain beliefs or attitudes thus bear the burden of
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proving that claim. See WEST, supra, at 18. This point is all the more true if we distinguish
"mere aggregate groups" from those who identify with one another based on a consciousness
of shared belonging and solidarity. See DAVID INGRAM, GROUP RIGHTS: RECONCILING
EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCE 52-54 (2000). The former can lead to the creation of the latter,
but the latter seek to build solidarity through commonality and are thus more likely to widely
share certain attitudes. See id.
The level of generality at which we define attitudes similarly affects whether they are
sufficiently similar to be seen as shared. Jesse Jackson and Justice Clarence Thomas, two
well-known African American figures, disagree both about certain values and their meaning.
See id. at 59. Nevertheless, they might share a "common perspective accompanied by
feelings of corporeal vulnerability and perhaps corporeal alienation," id. at 58, in this sense:
[D]espite their different interests and value judgments, both Jackson and Thomas have spoken
poignantly about the discrimination and hardship they as blacks have had to endure. In other
words, Thomas and Jackson share, along with virtually every African American, a general
perspective on race, an understanding unique to blacks of what it is like to grow up as a "black
person" in a "white" society.
Id. at 59.
Third, I have spoken for simplicity's sake of one group's perspective prevailing over
another's. But numerous alternative outcomes are possible: only part of one group's
perspective but none of another's may prevail; or no part of either group's views may win.
What a respect-based jurisprudence counsels is to look at the history and current experiences
and views of those groups who are, or were, historically most vulnerable to suffering from
certain state search and seizure practices.
This listening helps better to inform the eventual normative judgment. Such listening
also ensures more adequate representation of under-represented voices in law-creation
(including diverse views within each group), builds empathy for the plight of others, and
prods new and perhaps clearer ways to conceptualize the problems and solutions being
considered. See, e.g., FORRELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 165, at xvii-xxii, 184-85; WEST,
supra, at 18-19. But the ultimate result is a normative judgment, including what the best
moral/political conception of respect requires.
Professors Caroline A. Forrell and Donna Matthews have notably suggested applying a
"reasonable woman standard" to both men and women in a wide array of gender related
aspects of law. See FORRELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 165, at xvii-xxi, 184-85. But they
are not defining that standard as an empirical matter, that is, as how most women would
view certain questions. See id. Rather, the "reasonable woman" is a normative construct
embodying the values of respect, personal autonomy, agency, and bodily integrity, as
informed by women's history, experiences, and attitudes. See id. at xiv. Although I argue
elsewhere for a more contextual approach to criminal procedure, a "reasonable young
African American male" standard will similarly in fact make sense in many areas. Cf
TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 438-39, 443 (illustrating usefulness of "African
American" perspectives in defining the reasonable person when distinguishing seizures from
voluntary encounters, stops from arrests, and consensual searches from their opposite).
Moreover, applying such standards equally to all persons can be "transformative and foster
meaningful and positive equality." FORRELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 165, at xxi.
Finally, minority and majority groups will agree on many issues, or at least there will
be reason to believe that they will agree, even though our evidence on the point is limited.
But making the effort to discover the existence and reasons for areas of commonality can
itself be a worthwhile endeavor.
In short, an essentially normative analysis that is informed by on-average group
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First, a case can be, and often has been, made for the American
people's being committed by the Reconstruction Amendments to providing
heightened protection to certain groups, paradigmatically including African
Americans.347 If Brown was indeed in part about those amendments'
prohibiting state conduct that stigmatizes such groups, then we can fairly
derive the principle that we are committed to safeguarding protected groups
from state-sanctioned stigma. 348  But group members are not protected
against all demeaning state actions. At a minimum, however, they are
protected against stigma imposed because of their membership in the
subordinated group, an arbitrary reason for imposing such a burden.349
They are also only protected if their own sense of stigma results from sound
reasons. 350 Whether reasons are sound requires exploring in greater depth
the nature of our commitments as a people, which in turn requires
examining the history that stirred Constitution-altering passions and led to
current practices. 351 The endurance into the present, even if in superficially
altered form, of cultural symbols and actions reminiscent of a protected
group's history of cultural subordination constitutes a sound reason for
group members to experience insult.35 2 In such a circumstance, deferring to
the protected group's interpretation of the meaning of a challenged action
makes sense.
But we can go even one step further. The Civil War alerted our polity
to the tremendous dangers raised by relationships even resembling that of
experiences and perspectives and in which no single group's views are mandated to prevail
(in part or in toto) in any single instance is not fairly characterized as involving a false,
homogeneous "essential" group nature. See INGRAM, supra, at 57 (defining "essentialist").
347 See BARROW & DIENES, supra note 102, at 218-92 (summarizing modem equal
protection doctrine); RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 182-84, 190-207 (holding that Civil
War and later Black Codes are essential to understanding the core constitutional
commitments embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment).
348 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 299, at 68-99 (making similar argument). Koppelman
argues that all anti-discrimination theorists ultimately ground their arguments in stigma-
minimization concepts, albeit different theories emphasizing different points in the process
by which stigma does its work: stigma-creation, stigma manifestation in decisionmaking,
and stigma internalization into the hearts of those participating in the culture. See id. at 97.
349 See William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in T1E
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 65-71 (Michael J.
Meyer ed., 1992) (arguing that both the criminal procedure protections of the Bill of Rights
and due process protect against arbitrary state-sanctioned contempt and disparagement);
KARST, supra note 65, at 15-27.
350 This follows from the idea that whether we privilege a group's perspective concerning
respect is a normative question. See supra text accompanying notes 270-312.
351 See supra text accompanying notes 314-42 (discussing the role of
commitmentarianism in constitutional interpretation).
352 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 299, at 68-76; Lawrence, supra note 272, at 324, 386.
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master to slave.35 3 The core benefit to slaveholders and the defining
essence of the American variation of slavery as a social institution "were
emotional rather than tangible, generating a sense of honor for the master
and of dishonor for the slave. 3 54 As Orlando Patterson has explained:
The real sweetness of mastery for the slaveholder lay not immediately in profit, but in
the lightening of the soul that comes with the realization that at one's feet is another
human creature who lives and breathes only for one's self, as a surrogate for one's
power, as a living embodiment of one's manhood and honor.
355
The harm done by any system that sanctions white identity and worth
as rooted in black degradation is so enormous that even a significant risk of
356its occurrence must be prevented. Behavior that creates such a risk, even
if unconscious, and even without proof of black understanding of the
message of degradation or black psychic pain, must be combated. 7 Where
there are sound reasons for a protected group to feel insulted, such a risk is
present.358 This conclusion offers a basis for re-interpreting Brown in the
way that Charles Lawrence has, namely as prohibiting the state's fostering
or sanctioning actions or cultural symbols plausibly carrying an
unconscious message of black inferiority and subpersonhood.5 9
Several corollaries and caveats must be noted. First, shared
understandings are still relevant. Where dominant and subordinate groups
share an understanding of an action as carrying a culturally stigmatizing
meaning, no further inquiry seems necessary.36 ° Where they disagree or
proof of majority understandings is scarce, the subordinate group's
interpretation matters both because the harms caused by such perceptions
are themselves ones we should strive to reduce (as Brown recognized) and
because they alert us to the need for inquiry to determine whether there are
353 KOPPELMAN, supra note 299, at 62.
354 Id.
355 PATTERSON, supra note 153, at 78.
356 See generally JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND
FUTURE REPARATIONS (2000) (cataloguing these harms).
357 See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 274 (illustrating social harms caused by subconscious
psychological processes of group devaluation and prototype bias); Lawrence, supra note 272
(similar).
358 Cf Taslitz, Racist Personality, supra note 60, at 762-65 (discussing why the mere risk
of state-sanctioned or tolerated group stigmatization justifies ethical and legal intervention).
359 See Lawrence, supra note 272, at 324, 358-59, 363, 377-79; Charles R. Lawrence, IIl,
If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 59-62 (Mari J.
Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).
360 Cf Lawrence, supra note 272 (discussing the "cultural meaning" test).
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361sound reasons for their perceptions. If they sensibly have or could
interpret the challenged practice as insulting, their perspective prevails.
Second, though I have used African Americans as the paradigm group,
there are, of course, already other recognized protected groups. 362 But that
does not necessarily mean that the sphere of protected groups should not
grow or that who may count as in need of special protection may not vary
with context.363
Third, the emphasis on sound reasons for insult means that a protected
group will not always prevail. A group's sense of insult may be based on
inadequate information, result from too quickly drawing negative
conclusions, or stem from conduct outside the sphere of the people's
commitments.3M
Fourth, even if there are sound reasons for insult, that is not alone
enough to invalidate a practice. Society legitimately has competing goals to
preventing group stigma. A principle of empathy may aid in the fair
balancing of priorities:
The harms that the stigma and group-disadvantaging theories identify are not
sufficient without balancing to make out a Fourteenth Amendment claim, because the
prevention of these harms is not an absolute goal. The question arises again whether
the law would find these injuries a price worth paying if they fell on whites.
365
Fifth, while protected groups merit heightened concern, our people's
commitments do not extend only to those groups.366 Whites are more likely
than blacks to suffer a non-comparative harm, that is, the state is unlikely to
engage in conduct that insults a white person because he is white. 67
Nevertheless, any state conduct that treats a white person as less than fully
361 See supra text accompanying notes 211-48, 274-312.
362 See, e.g., BARROW & DIENES, supra note 102, at 228-67.
363 See generally DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: RACE,
GENDER, RELIGION As ANALOGIES (1999).
364 The Miami Cuban-Americans opposing Elian Gonzales's return to his father and to
Cuba illustrate all three problems. They made assumptions that Elian's father was being
coerced into returning Elian to Cuba without case-specific evidence that this was so; they
relied on the Castro regime's evil nature as self-evidently over-riding other concerns; and
they therefore ignored the fundamental American commitment to the biological family unit.
See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2323-47.
365 KOPPELMAN, supra note 299, at 110.
366 Thus the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection clauses protect all
"persons," and the Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people," not the rights of
only certain racial or ethnic groups. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, XIV.
367 On white privilege, see generally CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE
MIRROR (Richard Delgado ed., 2000); CUPIT, supra note 180, at 28-33 (explaining that there
are two forms of unfitting treatment-comparative and non-comparative).
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human is to be constitutionally condemned.368 Indeed, one way to build
political support for a respect-based jurisprudence is to ask what is
necessary to protect vulnerable groups and then extend that protection to
369everyone.
Finally, because the Fourth Amendment is incorporated against the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment, the above discussion of Fourteenth
Amendment stigma concepts is helpful in interpreting the Fourth
Amendment. 70  Importantly, the white and black communities have
historically had different relationships with the police. Whites often see the
police as public servants protecting lives and property.371 "For blacks, those
entrusted with law enforcement and the firepower that gives them authority
have," however, "always been servants of the white men in power who
exploit blacks economically and demean them socially."37 That is all the
368 See supra text accompanying notes 180-90 (describing how one can be unfittingly
treated as less than human in ways that have nothing to do with your race or other group
membership).
369 One reason for opposition to race-based affirmative action is the belief that it benefits
minorities to the detriment of the white majority. See, e.g., CHARLES R. LAWRENCE & MARI
MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 181 (1997)
("The myth that affirmative action helps only the privileged ...assumes that the sole
beneficiaries of affirmative action are 'privileged' women and minorities."). One of the
arguments sometimes made for preferring class-based affirmative action is precisely that it
will foster cross-racial coalitions. Cf RONALD J. FISCUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 10-11 (1992) (arguing that race-based affirmative action justified by
compensatory justice breeds class-based resentment). Although I reject the idea of ending
race based affirmative action, the insight that programs perceived as widely distributing their
benefits are more likely to survive the political marketplace is correct and should be equally
applicable to the Fourth Amendment context. See Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note
1, at 128 n.171, 138 (explaining that, although it is a contextual question, the broad-based
imposition of search and seizure policy costs and benefits on many groups often makes
abuse of Fourth Amendment rights less likely). See generally William Stuntz, Implicit
Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 558-90
(1992) (flatly asserting that the broad distribution of the costs of searches and seizures will
spur majoritarian political action that will cure unwise infringements on Fourth Amendment
freedoms). Stuntz's insufficient consideration of context ignores, however, the forces that
can sometimes slow or halt this process of political homeostasis. See Taslitz, Twenty-First
Century, supra note 1, at 128 n.171, 138.
370 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 39-40, 427, 433-38 (discussing the
incorporation doctrine); Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147 (explaining and illustrating
how Fourteenth Amendment stigma-like concepts can inform Fourth Amendment analysis).
371 See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147. The picture of black-white differences
concerning the police that I have just expressed in text is more subtle, varied, and complex
than I have just presented it, but none of those subtleties would alter my analysis here. See
supra note 62 (summarizing data on respective white and black attitudes toward the police).
372 See Lawrence, supra note 272, at 371.
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more reason for a respect-based Fourth Amendment to be attentive to
relevant black history and current attitudes.
IV. WHY THESE QUESTIONS ARE BEST ADDRESSED UNDER THE MUTATED
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The immediately preceding discussion, with its emphasis on
Fourteenth Amendment case law and history, raises this question: Why not
address respect-based search and seizure concerns under the Fourteenth
Amendment alone, rather than under some notion of a Reconstruction-
mutated Fourth Amendment at all? Specifically, why not address respect-
based concerns as equal protection or due process violations?
A. EQUAL PROTECTION
The response concerning the equal protection clause is fairly
straightforward. The Court has modernly interpreted that clause to require
proof of intentionally discriminatory application of the law by the police.37 3
At the same time, the Court has created such a high burden of proof for a
defendant even to obtain discovery on whether the state acted with a
discriminatory purpose as to render the effectiveness of the equal protection
clause as a means of monitoring police racial discrimination close to nil.374
Correspondingly, the Court has held that the subjective intentions of the
police, including proof of their racial animus, are irrelevant under the
Fourth Amendment.37 5
There is a strong argument that the Court was wrong to exclude proof
of racial animus as one way to establish a Fourth Amendment violation.376
Nevertheless, there is a plausible argument, not yet addressed by the
Supreme Court, that racially discriminatory effects alone can, at least under
certain conditions, render a search or seizure "unreasonable" under the
Fourth Amendment. Indeed, there is language in at least one Supreme
Court opinion suggesting that the mere risk of discriminatory police action,
or even simply the mere perception of such a risk by affected minority
373 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 443-45; United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S.
456 (1996) (holding that a defendant challenging allegedly racially disparate federal crack
cocaine prosecutions under the Equal Protection Clause could not even obtain discovery
without first proving that similarly situated defendants of other races were known to
prosecutors, despite defendant's having already submitted several affidavits supporting that
point).
374 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 443-45; Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996).
371 See, e.g., Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147, at 771-75.
376 See, e.g., Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 40 (arguing for the relevance of
racial impact to Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing).
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communities, is at least a relevant factor in determining Fourth Amendment
reasonableness.377
Therefore, where proof of police animus is lacking, no Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim is viable. But a Fourth Amendment
claim still may be.
Perhaps even more importantly, the Fourth Amendment has
substantive content, that is, the amendment can be violated even absent
proof of either discriminatory effects or intentions. Thus any arrest requires
probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime, and many
lesser intrusions upon the person, such as a "stop" for brief police
questioning, require individualized reasonable suspicion.378  Similarly,
arrests in the home require arrest warrants, and searches of the home require
search warrants.379 Failure of the police to use a warrant or to refrain from
acting until they gather probable cause invalidates searches of white persons
every bit as much as it invalidates searches of black persons.
Racial discrimination may be involved in some suspicionless and
warrantless searches, but such discrimination must not necessarily be
proven to make out a Fourth Amendment claim. This insight proves
important, for example, in understanding the story of the Japanese-
377 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 n.ll, 17 n.14 (1968) ("[T]he degree of
community resentment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assessment of
the quality of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security caused by
those practices."); Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 40, at 362-75 (analyzing Terry
and other Supreme Court case law suggesting the Fourth Amendment relevance of racial
impact). I agree with Professor Maclin that Terry recognized the relevance of racial impact
to Fourth Amendment reasoning, but, though ambiguous on the point, the Court seemed to
suggest that a major part of the problem was one that legislators or the executive, but not the
criminal courts, were competent to address. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15.
The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police community, of which minority
groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of
evidence from any criminal trial. Yet a rigid and unthinking application of the exclusionary rule,
in futile protest against practices which it can never be used effectively to control, may exact a
high toll in human injury and frustration of efforts to prevent crime.
Id. But see id. at 14-16 (then immediately adding, "[C]ourts still retain their traditional
responsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which
trenches upon personal security without the evidentiary justification which the Constitution
requires. [S]uch conduct . . .must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be
excluded from evidence in criminal trials."). For an argument at the other extreme from
Professor Maclin's, see Adina Schwartz, "Just Take Away Their Guns ": The Hidden Racism
of Terry v. Ohio, 23 FORDHAAM URB. L.J. 317 (1996) (arguing that Terry rendered race
irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment).
378 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 299-300 (describing arrests), 342 (describing
protective sweeps), 298-316 (describing stops and frisks), 369-70 (describing special needs
searches of high school student purses).
379 See id. at 269-70.
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American internment during World War II. Many citizens were in effect
rounded up, arrested, and incarcerated for years at a time without a warrant
or any individualized evidence of wrongdoing.38° An equality norm had
been breached because the round-up was based on race and ethnicity, but
there were independent grounds of complaint apart from any unequal
treatment. A suspicionless arrest is violative of an important principle of
the American understanding of human dignity:
Political power must . . .be justified in terms of public reasons accessible to and
available to all as beings capable of epistemic and practical rationality, that is, in
terms of assessments of fact consistent with reliable and publicly understood
procedures of empirical investigation and in light of... the common or general goods
that all reasonably demand in order to pursue their ends, whatever they are ....
Failure to respect this requirement bases the exercise of political power on sectarian
assessments of fact or on values not reasonably available to all and thus fails to
respect the reasonable judgment, the dignity, of those who do not share these
assessments.381
The assumption that all Japanese-Americans were, by the mere fact of
their race alone, a threat to national security was not an "assessment of fact
consistent with publicly understood procedures of empirical investigation
... 382 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment requires precisely rational proof of
certain sorts of facts-such as individualized probable cause-to ensure
that fundamental entitlements at the core of human dignity are not
violated. 38 3  Japanese-Americans were doubly insulted-first by state
intrusion upon their autonomy absent proof of individualized suspicion of
their wrongdoing; second, by being treated disrespectfully because of their
race. The violations of equality norms and other sorts of autonomy-
protecting norms embodied in the Fourth Amendment were inseparable.
Thoroughly addressing the problems involved required viewing the events
surrounding the internment as Fourth Amendment wrongs, informed by
Fourteenth Amendment equality values. To treat this infamous episode as
380 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2300-13
(describing internment process in detail and its implications for modem Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence).
381 Richards, supra note 247, at 93-94; cf Parent, supra note 349, at 65 ("Constitutional
due process ... condemns governmental denials of life, liberty, or property based on beliefs
or feelings that have no factual support," thus forbidding the government from punishing an
individual because "he looks like the kind of person who could have committed this
offense."); infra text accompanying notes 385-417 (explaining why the sorts of evidentiary
concerns raised by Professor Parent are better addressed as Fourth Amendment rather than
due process concerns).
382 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2301-02.
383 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 178-96 (describing standards of evidentiary
proof of probable cause).
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an equal protection violation alone is to distort the full nature of the wrong
done, to contribute to minimizing Fourth Amendment values in much the
way that the mere technicality view of that Amendment does, and to miss
the important lessons that the internment can teach about search and seizure
law today-lessons not learned if the event is viewed as a highly unusual
violation of equality norms alone rather than also as a reminder of the
enduring substantive dangers against which the Fourth Amendment
protects.384
B. DUE PROCESS
The Due Process Clause analysis is a bit more complex. Because the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is the very reason that the
Fourth Amendment applies to the states,385 in a sense every state search and
seizure already requires due process analysis. 386 The question is whether,
apart from applying the Fourth Amendment to the states as an essential
aspect of "fundamental fairness," the Due Process Clause serves some
independent, freestanding function in addressing search and seizure
issues.
387
The Court has at times strongly disfavored the concept of freestanding
due process where a particular Bill of Rights provision seems to control.
388
In Dowling v. United States,389 Justice White, writing for the Court, was
quite clear: "Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation. We, therefore, have
384 1 have been arguing throughout this piece that the Fourth Amendment must be read as
informed by Fourteenth Amendment equality values. Because the Fourteenth Amendment
mentions only the "state," not the federal, government, arguably the Fourteenth Amendment
did not change the Fourth Amendment's meaning or that of due process when applied to the
Federal government. This would seem to be an odd result: one set of search and seizure
rules for the states, a different set for the federal government. The Court arguably ruled out
such oddities in Boiling v. Sharpe, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), holding that Fifth Amendment due
process restrictions on the federal government embraced Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection concepts that applied in the same fashion to both levels of government. Although
the logic of Boiling has been sharply criticized, other scholars have articulated a more
persuasive series of justifications for the Boiling result than did the Court itself, see WHAT
BROWN SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 306, at 59-64, rendering it unnecessary for me to
worry further that the "oddity argument" for varying the Fourth Amendment's meaning
based solely on what level of government is involved will be taken seriously.
385 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2300-13.
386 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 13, 39-40; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). See generally Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure:
The Supreme Court's Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 303 (2001).
387 See generally Israel, supra note 386.
388 See id. at 388-89.
389 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
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defined the category of infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness' very
narrowly."'3 90  Subsequently, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court
majority in Medina v. California,39' explained that the Court had "defined
the category of infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness' narrowly"
given the recognition that "[b]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in
the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation. 392 The
Bill of Rights, the Court has explained, speaks specifically to many aspects
of criminal procedure. Expanding those rights would, in the Court's view,
invite undue interference with considered state legislative judgments and
with the careful balance struck by the Constitution between order and
liberty.393
The Court specifically addressed whether the Fourth Amendment pre-
empts further due process analysis in Gerstein v. Pugh.394 There, a Florida
procedure in non-capital cases permitted a prosecutor to proceed against a
suspect by way of information rather than grand jury indictment but without
a prior preliminary hearing. That meant that a person arrested without a
warrant might not receive a judicial determination of probable cause until
after arraignment on the information, a month or more after arrest. A lower
federal court held that this procedure violated the Fourth Amendment and
directed the Florida courts to provide prompt preliminary hearings.
The United States Supreme Court agreed that a prompt probable cause
hearing was required under the Fourth Amendment. But the Court rejected
mandating the protections of a full adversarial preliminary hearing under
that amendment. After all, explained the Court, the amendment permits
arrests with warrants stemming from ex parte proceedings involving no
more than sworn affidavits as supporting evidence.
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, 39 disagreed with the
Court's rejection of the adversarial preliminary hearing requirement. In
Justice Stewart's view, more of an interest was involved than an improper
initial arrest under the Fourth Amendment. The "continued incarceration of
a presumptively innocent person" was, for Justice Stewart, a due process
question. Yet a series of civil due process rulings had required more
substantial hearings before seizing property or terminating benefits than the
390 Id. at 352.
39 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
392 Id. at 443 (citing Dowling, 493 U.S. at 352).
393 Israel, supra note 386, at 388-89 nn.480, 482.
394 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
395 Id. at 126 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Court required in connection with seizing a person to begin criminal
proceedings against him.3 96
The majority's response to this argument was forthright:
Mr. Justice Stewart objects to the Court's choice of the Fourth Amendment as the
rationale for decision .... Here we deal with the complex procedures of a criminal
case and a threshold right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The historical basis
of the probable cause requirement is quite different from relatively recent application
of variable procedural due process in debtor-creditor disputes and termination of
government-created benefits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the
criminal justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests always
has been thought to define the "process that is due" for seizures ofpersons or property
in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial.
397
Despite these pronouncements and arguably similar ones in later
Fourth Amendment cases, 398 "[t]he response of the Gerstein majority ...
largely has been forgotten., 399  The Court has more recently stopped
speaking of freestanding due process as having only "limited operation. '4 °°
The Court continues to speak of the need for restraint, but rests that caution
on the primary responsibility of the states for criminal justice and as
"laboratories for testing solutions to novel legal problems." 40 1 Moreover, if
we look at what the Court does rather than just at what it says, freestanding
due process seems to continue to play an important role, even where
specific Bill of Rights provisions arguably control. Thus the Court has
sometimes failed even to consider the application of a specific provision,
other times simply preferred to rest on due process alone, and still other
times initially relied on due process but later or simultaneously
supplemented its reasoning by resort to a specific provision.40 2  Professor
Jerold Israel, in an exhaustive recent history of freestanding due process in
criminal cases, notes that many plausible positions on the question can be
read from the Court's precedent, and still other plausible positions can
fairly be expected to arise before the Court in the future.40 3
396 See id. at 127 (Stewart, J., concurring).
197 Id. at 125 n.27 (Stewart, J., concurring).
398 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Israel, supra note 386, at 399-407
(analyzing significance of this and related cases for the relative responsibilities of the Due
Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment).
399 Israel, supra note 386, at 405.
400 See id. at 397-98.
401 See id. at 397-99 (reviewing case law).
402 See id. at 405-14 (summarizing case law).
403 See id. at 424-26. Professor Margaret L. Paris has argued that the Court's failure to
clarify its criminal justice due process jurisprudence and the implicit underlying human
rights justifications has undermined political support for strong due process protections in
criminal cases. See Margaret L. Paris, Why It Matters, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 495 (2001).
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Nevertheless, Professor Israel believes that a few generalizations can
be made. Most importantly, with a few exceptions, freestanding due
process rulings tend to focus on the value of adjudicatory fairness--on
protecting against conviction of the innocent-"rather than on the broader
range of values reflected in the whole of the specific guarantees. 40 4 The
Fourth Amendment, as currently and properly understood, has little to do
with protecting against convicting the innocent.40 5 The exclusionary rule in
fact serves to make it harder to convict the guilty by excluding probative
inculpatory evidence from the jury's hearing.40 6 The amendment and the
remedies it offers are designed to serve purposes other than determining
historical truth, including preventing unjustified police intrusions on
persons' privacy, property, and freedom of movement, though the exclusion
of evidence may at times incidentally benefit the innocent as well.407
404 Israel, supra note 386, at 397-98.
405 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (asserting that the exclusionary rule in
Fourth Amendment cases impedes truth-finding function at trial, and thus the rule's
application depends on the weight of countervailing concerns). Although the Fourth
Amendment does not directly promote the discovery of truth at trial, it can sometimes do so
indirectly. For example, strong screening mechanisms to prevent arrests based on ignorant
or lying informants thus halts their repeating their lies at trial, lies occasionally believed to
the regret of wholly innocent defendants. Cf TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 59
(summarizing the dangers informants pose to the innocent and cataloging potential
solutions).
406 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 935 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing view that the Fourth
Amendment "comprises a personal right to exclude all evidence secured by means of
unreasonable searches and seizures"). Justice Brennan continues:
If nothing else, the [Fourth] Amendment plainly operates to disable the government from
gathering information and securing evidence in certain ways. In practical terms, of course, this
restriction of official power means that some incriminating evidence inevitably will go
undetected if the government obeys these constitutional restraints. It is the loss of that evidence
that is the "price" our society pays for enjoying the freedom and privacy safeguarded by the
Fourth Amendment. Thus, some criminals will go free, not, in Justice (then Judge) Cardozo's
misleading epigram, "because the constable has blundered" [citation omitted], but rather because
official compliance with Fourth Amendment requirements make it more difficult to catch
criminals. Understood in this way, the Amendment directly contemplates that some reliable and
incriminating evidence will be lost to the government; therefore it is not the exclusionary rule,
but the Amendment itself that has imposed this cost.
Id. at 941. But see AMAR, FIRST PRINCIPLES, supra note 22, at 25-31 (arguing for giving the
truth-finding function greater weight in Fourth Amendment analysis).
407 Cf TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 579-87 (reviewing purposes of the
exclusionary rule other than truth-promotion, especially in the Fourth Amendment context);
Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2316-27 (detailed analysis
of a Fourth Amendment violation that ensnared the innocent); Taslitz, Twenty-First Century,
supra note 1, at 138 n.87 (discussing the "trilogy" of Fourth Amendment interests in privacy,
property, and freedom of movement).
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Furthermore, freestanding due process criminal justice rulings are,
408
again with exceptions, largely limited to the facts of each specific case.
This approach is not entirely inconsistent with Fourth Amendment case law,
which also is often fact-sensitive and relies on "totality of the
circumstances" tests.40 9 But the Court also strives in its Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence toward more bright-line, case-transcendent rules to give
clearer guidance to the police. 4'0  The Fourth Amendment thus seems a
more appropriate constitutional vehicle than due process-though it is
nevertheless still a flawed vehicle-for attempting to fuse flexibility with
predictability.
Focusing on the Fourth Amendment also prods the Court toward a
closer analysis of the interests at stake-privacy, property, and free
movement4l'-as best understood in light of the history of search and
seizure practices 2.4 1  Both the history of those practices leading up to that
amendment and the later history of why continued concerns about those
practices required the Fourth Amendment's incorporation into the
Fourteenth Amendment413 are helpful.
Indeed, what is the point of incorporation at all if search and seizure
practices are analyzed under the due process clause as a free-standing
entity? If I am right that our political commitments as a nation can only be
understood as an evolving narrative over time, then our commitments in the
area of search and seizure practices that began with the original Fourth
Amendment are today best understood in terms of the evolving meaning
and history of that amendment over time. That evolution includes the
Fourth Amendment's ultimate mutation by the Fourteenth.41 4
408 See Israel, supra note 386, at 396.
409 See id. (making similar point).
410 See supra text accompanying notes 95-130 (describing how the Supreme Court
majority in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), decided recently, stressed the
importance of simple bright-line rules in the constitutional law of search and seizure);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that there is automatic police authority
for a warrantless search of the person and grabbing room of an arrestee without any
suspicion justifying that search if pursuant to a valid arrest).
411 See Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note 1, at 138 n.87 (summarizing the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment).
412 See generally Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147 (describing relevance of
history of search and seizure practices during slavery and Reconstruction).
413 See generally id. (explaining the evolving history of the Fourth Amendment from
slavery to Reconstruction).
414 See id. at 761-79 (stating that fair procedures inherent in Fourth Amendment require
wide open defense discovery in preparation for suppression hearing). But see Israel, supra
note 386, at 390 (describing two cases concerning fair procedures in connection with
suppression hearings but decided as due process questions).
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The real error may lie in the quest to think of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments as sharply distinct from one another in the area of
searches and seizures. Although the Fourth Amendment is not designed to
further the truth-finding function at trial, the Amendment does require fair
procedures in fact-finding at hearings on motions to suppress evidence. 415
That requirement is due-process-like.416  Yet those procedures are
undertaken to ensure better protection of Fourth Amendment interests in the
way that that amendment seems to contemplate. Correspondingly, the
Fourth Amendment's meaning changed, as did that of the entire Bill of
Rights, as part of the same struggle over slavery that led to the Fourteenth
Amendment's adoption.1 The two amendments cannot, therefore, be
adequately understood in isolation. Each informs the other. It thus seems
most congenial to effect a partial fusion of the two, viewing the post-
Reconstruction Fourth Amendment as mutated by the equality, dignity, and
fairness concerns of the Fourteenth. In any event, given the lack of clarity
of the high Court's precedent on the respective functions of these
amendments, this view is at least a plausible place to start.
V. WHAT PRACTICAL DIFFERENCE WILL A RESPECT-BASED SEARCH AND
SEIZURE JURISPRUDENCE MAKE?
My use of the word "respect" may be troubling to some readers. In
everyday usage, the word often implies simple courtesy. 18 An image is
called to mind of an officer speaking in gentle tones, listening attentively to
a driver's explanation of why he ran a red light, then issuing the ticket
anyway. The officer listened and spoke "respectfully," but the results of his
interaction with the driver were unchanged.
That is not worrisome if the officer had every right to stop the driver.
But if the officer lied about the color of the light to meet some self-imposed
ticketing quota, his conduct would still be wrong. Its wrongness would be
unaltered even if the officer convinced the driver that the light was indeed
red, the driver therefore feeling that he was treated fairly.
Respectful listening and speaking in the sense used in this example are
part of what a respect-based constitutional philosophy embraces. Such
415 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2282-84
(arguing that requirements of group voice and evidentiary accuracy under the Fourth
Amendment serve important psychological and political purposes); TASLITZ & PARIS, supra
note 30, at 5, 182-96, 210-14 (describing Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on
evidentiary accuracy).
416 See generally Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147.
417 See sources cited supra note 410.
418 See WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 474 (2000).
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behavior in fact is simply good policing, enhancing the community's
willingness to support police actions.419 But respectful treatment requires
more. The mendacious officer in the altered hypothetical acts
disrespectfully despite his courtesy. He treats the driver as a mere "means,"
not an end in himself, effectively punishing the driver in a way that he did
not deserve.42°
Current jurisprudence would, of course, condemn the above officer's
conduct if his lies were discovered.421  But in many other situations, a
respect-based jurisprudence will lead to different results than under current
law. As I explore in more depth elsewhere, a respect-based approach has
implications for every current search and seizure doctrine.422
I am generally more concerned in one of my companion pieces on
respect with showing rather than telling.423 Nevertheless, I want briefly to
note here seven important ways in which my approach can change results.
First, a respect-based approach will alter the nature of fact-finding at
suppression hearings and in magistrates' decisions on warrant applications.
Judges thus must often decide whether there was reasonable suspicion for
police to stop a pedestrian whom the officers believed to be involved in a
crime.424  But "reasonable suspicion"-like "negligence" in a tort trial or
"consent" in a rape trial-is not some indisputable truth existing "out
there." If we could time travel, there are of course some relevant historical
truths that we could discover. Did the suspect run upon police arriving on
the scene, or did he simply continue leisurely walking? How tall was he?
There are clear true or false answers to these questions.425
Once we know the historical truth, however, we must decide whether,
given the information available to the police, their suspicion of the
419 See DAVID HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK
(2002) (providing an extended defense of this point).
420 See supra text accompanying notes 180-200 (discussing Kantian rule of respect: Treat
persons as ends unto themselves and never as mere means).
421 See, e.g., Taslitz, Twenty-First Century, supra note I (search definition); Andrew E.
Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment? Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1 (2002) (consent search and
administrative search doctrines); Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45, at 239-58 (racial
profiling and stop-and-frisk).
422 See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147 (illustrating some of these doctrinal
implications); Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note I (illustrating
other doctrinal implications); Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45 (illustrating still further
doctrinal implications); and my forthcoming book on the subject.
423 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1.
424 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).




pedestrian was "reasonable." Yet that question turns on a series of value-
based judgments about what inferences can fairly be drawn, and with what
degree of confidence, from the information available. If minority and
majority communities on average draw very different conclusions from the
same observations, whose perspective the courts recognize alters the
outcome. As one illustration, assume that police see a young African
American male in a poor, predominantly African American neighborhood
"fleeing" when police arrive on the scene.426 The white middle class
majority might see such flight as revealing the suspect's consciousness of
guilt.4 27 The African American community likely sees the youth's flight as
more consistent with self-preservation, fleeing because he wants to avoid
the risk of an unfair and unpleasant confrontation with the police.428
Current law generally favors the consciousness of guilt argument, but a
respect-based jurisprudence, absent more individualized evidence, favors
the self-preservation inference.4 29
Second, by infusing equality norms into the Fourth Amendment, a
respect-based jurisprudence makes inquiry into discriminatory police
motives and racially disparate police actions relevant at suppression
hearings.43 o Moreover, standards of discovery and proof must be receptive
426 This hypothetical is based on a series of real-world cases, one of which reached the
Supreme Court, discussed in depth in Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect,




430 The ideas of "respect" and "justice" are intimately related, both being members of the
"fittingness" family of concepts, with respect being the broader notion. See CutIT, supra
note 180, at 15-33. "Justice" (I am oversimplifying a bit here) is fitting treatment
demonstrated by a person or entity deemed especially competent to judge what is fitting and
directed toward a being with the capacity to understand what is happening. See id. at 20, 23.
If one lawyer treats another lawyer or a judge in a trial courtroom unfittingly, that is
disrespect. If a trial judge treats either lawyer unfittingly in ways deemed to be within the
ambit of the judge's role as a judge, that is injustice. See id. at 15-33. But it is also
disrespect. See id. at 15-33.
Among the various justice motives is retribution-the desire to bring an offender down
a peg, to demonstrate to his victim and society that he is in fact of no greater worth than his
victim. See generally Neil Vidmar, Retribution and Revenge, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE
RESEARCH IN LAW 31-64 (2001). Retribution need not be solely in the form of criminal
punishment, and we feel the need for retribution against those who have treated us
unfittingly, even if not technically "unjustly" in the sense defined above. See id.; Taslitz,
Civil Society, supra note 86. Retribution reinforces equality. See Vidmar, supra, at 36-37;
Taslitz, Civil Society, supra, 313-24, 335-39. Our strongest retributive desires arise from
being intentionally victimized by another, although we also feel lesser degrees of retributive
need when faced, in descending order, with knowing, reckless, and negligent insulting
conduct. See Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 86, at 335-38 nn.165-66. Additionally,
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to these concerns. 43 ' Racial profiling claims are not, therefore, relegated to
hard-to-prove equal-protection-based civil class actions.432 Rather, they are
also central Fourth Amendment concerns of the criminal justice system.
433
Furthermore, because racially disparate impact theories should be
embraced, evidence of certain widespread police practices, rather than only
of the conduct of the individual officers involved in a specific complaint,
becomes highly relevant.434 As noted earlier, current law by contrast
prohibits inquiry into subjective police officer motivations under the Fourth
Amendment and is ambiguous about the relevance of disparate impact.
Much case law also often limits evidence of police misconduct to the
officers' actions in the individual case, making patterns of police conduct
435difficult to prove.
Third, for novel cases, the Court balances the depth of the state's
intrusion on the individual against the state's justifications for its actions to
determine what is reasonable. Usually the Court engages in "categorical
balancing," crafting a new rule to determine reasonableness in future
insults that demean us based on our membership in groups central to our identity inflict
especially painful psychic wounds. See id. at 349-55. When police engage in actions
insulting the equal worth of citizens, therefore, police motives matter in determining the
depth of the resulting social injury and the remedy required to restore equality norms.
Racially disparate impact is also likely to promote at least the perception of racial
insult. See Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 40, at 386-92. Furthermore, disparate
impact raises concerns about police abuse of discretion, see id. at 376-79, perhaps based on
entirely subconscious flaws in reasoning and perception. Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping
the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956, 983-88 (1999)
(reviewing social science research concerning impact of categorization, schemas, and
stereotyping on police work). Equality norms require checking such abuses of discretion.
See id. at 1005-12. But police actions also treat persons unfittingly who are stopped without
adequate justification, separate and apart from equality norms. See supra text accompanying
notes 371-82.
431 On discovery, see generally Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147. For
illustrations of the Court's flawed standards of proof, see generally Taslitz, Stories of Fourth
Amendment Disrespect, supra note I.
432 See Sean P. Trende, Why Modest Proposals Offer the Best Solutions for Combating
Racial Profiling, 50 DUKE L.J. 331, 342-57 (2000) (cataloguing the many obstacles to a
successful civil suit equal protection claim, even if not always in the form of a class action,
for combating racial profiling).
133 See id. at 358-79 (making similar point). Trende also argues that Fourteenth
Amendment equality norms inform the Fourth Amendment's meaning, but he relies
primarily on text and precedent, rather than history, for support. See id. at 372-76.
434 See generally Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47
BUFF. L. REv. 1275 (1999) [hereinafter Bandes, Patterns of Injustice]; accord Susan Bandes,
Tracing the Pattern of No Pattern: Stories of Police Brutality, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 665
(2001).
435 See Bandes, Patterns of Injustice, supra note 434, at 1279-80, 1290-99.
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similar cases.4 36 This balancing currently involves a thumb on the police
side of the scale. 437 The Court frequently considers widely-defined social
benefits of police action but only its costs to the individual suspect.
438
When the Court does consider broader social costs, it often (albeit not
always) gives them short shrift.439 It also defines those costs narrowly,
often ignoring the impact of its decisions on racial unity, labor discipline,
and healthy human relationships. Police concerns are weighty; broader
citizenry sub-group concerns slight.440  A respect-based jurisprudence
would routinely consider all the social costs of police action, including the
impact on communities of color.44 1 That would not necessarily alter
outcomes in all cases because state actions under current law might meet
the requirements of respectful treatment. 442 But results may be changed in
some instances.
436 See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 169-75.
437 See Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 102, at 208-16, 228-29 (describing the
Court's reasonableness balancing approach as in practice a "rational basis" model of
decisionmaking, giving a "blank check" to the police); Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood
Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 723, 771 (1992)
[hereinafter Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall] ("[W]hen balancing occurs, the government
generally wins-at least in search and seizure cases. Few cases exist in which the
government's interest in effective law enforcement is insubstantial."). See generally Maclin,
Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 127 (arguing that Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
fails to provide adequate constraints on police discretion).
438 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note I (analyzing
illustrative cases, including the effects of searching individuals on broader communities);
TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 30, at 438-50 (summarizing impact of search and seizure
practices on racial sub-communities); Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45 (noting broad
impact of search and seizure practices on racial minorities, racial majorities, media, partisan
political groups, and the American people as a whole); cf Maclin, Justice Thurgood
Marshall, supra note 437, at 772.
[T]he Court's balancing process is distorted because it generally sees only a guilty defendant on
the other side of the scale .... When the Court proffers its reasoning and conclusions for a
particular result, it rarely considers the effect on innocent persons subjected to the police
intrusion permitted by the Court.
Id.
439 See supra text accompanying notes 95-130 (discussing the recent Atwater case).
440 See Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall, supra note 437, at 772 ("Foremost in the
minds of the Justices is the need for effective law enforcement. Thus, Fourth Amendment
rights are seldom considered positive rights. Rather, the Court generally views them as
restraints on law enforcement to be acknowledged, but not taken seriously.").
441 See generally Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note I
(illustrating how community-impact consideration would alter the Court's analyses).
442 See id. at 2327-55 (discussing why the Clinton Administration's actions in the Elian
Gonzales case met the requirements of respectful treatment).
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Notably, remember that in Terry v. Ohio,443 discussed earlier in this
article, the Supreme Court first permitted police stop-and-frisks on mere
reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. The Court acknowledged,
in passing only, its awareness of the "wholesale harassment by certain
elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly
Negroes, frequently complain .... The Court elaborated, in a footnote,
that field interrogations "are a major source of friction between the police
and minority groups. 445  Additionally, the Court acknowledged that the
exacerbation of police-community tensions would be "particularly true in
situations where the 'stop and frisk' of youths or minority group members
is 'motivated by the officers' perceived need to maintain the power image
of the beat officer, an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone
who attempts to undermine police control of the streets.'
446
Nevertheless, despite this rare recognition of the risks to minority
community respect, the Court adopted the Terry stop-and-frisk on mere
reasonable suspicion rule, summarily concluding that such police
harassment would not be stopped by applying the exclusionary rule. Such
application would be a "futile protest" against practices that the Court
cannot control and would "exact a high toll in human injury and frustration
of efforts to prevent crime. Yet in the same paragraph, the Court
stressed that the judiciary "still retain their traditional responsibility to
guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing .... ,,448
The Court also declared that its words should "in no way discourage the
employment of other remedies than the exclusionary rule to curtail abuses
for which that sanction may prove inappropriate.
The Court's readiness to dismiss the effectiveness of the exclusionary
rule seems particularly odd in light of later decisions stressing the rule's
deterrent effect as its central justification.450 If the Court prohibited, and
443 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
444 Id. at 14.
441 id. at 14 n. 11.
446 id.
441 Id. at 15.
48 The Court was even more ambiguous in other language concerning whether it meant
to render exploration of the impact of its rules on racial minorities irrelevant, though in
practice it effectively so read Terry. Compare Schwartz, supra note 377, at 346 (arguing the
Terry Court recognized racial impact to make clear that it was irrelevant to Fourth
Amendment analysis) with Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 40, at 365-66 (arguing
the modem Court has ignored the racial impact analysis of Terry but nevertheless continued
in other precedent to consider such impact, a consideration ended by Whren).
44' Terry, 392 U.S. at 15.
450 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984).
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made subject to judicial sanction, street encounters on less than probable
cause, there would be no informed reason to believe that those encounters
would not decline.451
The Court had also then purportedly embraced a second rationale for
the exclusionary rule: protecting the "dignity" of the courts, that is, not
making them complicit in constitutional wrongdoing, a complicity
undermining respect for law.452 That recognition of the symbolic functions
of the Court's decisions might have prompted the Court to give greater
weight to the humiliation that unjustified street encounters cause to their
victims.
None of this means that the Terry rule itself is necessarily wrong. But
a respect-based jurisprudence would give the humiliation concerns noted by
the Court greater weight. Despite its ambiguity, Terry is fairly read as the
Court washing its hands of such concerns with humiliation.453 At a
minimum, a willingness to dirty its hands could have led the Court to
narrow the scope of the Terry rule. Instead, the rule and its unguided
balancing approach have expanded, making police intrusions based on
guesses and stereotypes all that much easier.454 The Court's refusal to
inquire into beat officers' subjective motivations may also have made more
likely the very sorts of police actions motivated by the police need to
"maintain the power image of the police officer" of which the Court
complained. Arguably, the result has been such fiascos as the recent Street
Crime Unit scandal in New York City and growing police-minority
community tensions.455 Perhaps Justice Douglas was right to worry in his
Terry dissent that the Court had taken "a long step down the totalitarian
path. , ' s6
451 See Thompson, supra note 430, at 1003 n.248 (summarizing scholarship making
similar argument for returning to a pre-Terry world).
452 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960) (asserting that exclusionary
rule is required by the "imperative of judicial integrity," meaning that the courts cannot
become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to
uphold").
453 See Maclin, Fourth Amendment, supra note 40, at 365-66 (suggesting Terry Court
either did wash its hands or modern Court has implicitly so reinterpreted Terry).
454 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry,
Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457 (2000) (providing
empirical data on Terry's impact on raced-based policing in New York City); Harris,
Particularized Suspicion, supra note 136 (discussing Terry and stereotyping).
455 See ELI B. SILVERMAN, N.Y.P.D. BATTLES CRIME: INNOVATIVE STRATEGIES IN
POLICING 187-89 (1999) (describing recent trials and tribulations of New York City's Street
Crime Unit and its aggressive tactics).
456 See Saleem, supra note 38; Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment
Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271 (1998); Maclin,
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Fourth, a respect-based jurisprudence emphasizes that all three
branches of government are bound by the Fourth Amendment.45 7 Terry 's
acknowledgement of other remedies than the exclusionary rule may
implicitly have embraced a judgment that other branches were better
equipped to address minority group concerns.458 If so, that is a judgment
that the Court should have defended. The Court has an obligation to create
incentives for other branches to meet their constitutional obligations.459
Bowing entirely out of setting adequate minimum standards for respectful
police behavior does not serve that goal.460 At a minimum, the Court
should have interceded with an express willingness to lower its vigilance if
other branches proved up to the task.461
Perhaps equally important, a three-branch emphasis introduces the
language of constitutionality, with its moral authority to persuade, into
legislative debates and police administrative decision-making.4 62  Each
463 eachbranch has its obligations, and each must be so reminded.464 Reminding
Fourth Amendment, supra note 40.
457 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2283. But see
FRANK WU, YELLOW: RACE IN AMERICA BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE 190-213 (2002)
(describing, albeit ultimately rejecting, the views of those who defend racial profiling as
"rational discrimination").
411 See William J. Stuntz, Terry's Impossibility, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1213, 1227-28
(1998) (arguing that courts can separate the most egregious police-citizen encounters from
the rest, but a more ambitious reasonableness agenda is better handled by other branches of
government); Meares & Kahan, supra note 49, at 3-30 (arguing that, at least under certain
conditions, the courts should defer to legislative judgments on what searches and seizures are
reasonable); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 932 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[T]he [Fourth] Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, restrains the power
of the government as a whole; it does not specify only a particular agency and exempt all
others. The judiciary is responsible, no less than the executive, for ensuring that
constitutional rights are respected.").
459 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2282.
460 See Luna, supra note 74, at 829-32, 837-48 (arguing that the courts, rather than the
legislature or executive, have the obligation to set a constitutional floor, protecting Fourth
Amendment "zones of sovereignty").
461 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1996) (encouraging Congress and
state legislatures to come up with their own standards for the admissibility of confessions "so
long as they are fully as effective as" the Miranda warnings); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 239 (1967) ("Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police
departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup
proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial, may also remove the
basis for regarding the stage as 'critical."').
462 See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 65, at 148-51.
463 See WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 212
(1996) (arguing that legislative and executive branches can sometimes secure constitutional
prerogatives "in ways that the judges alone could not"); Matthew Holden, Jr., Race and
Constitutional Change in the Twentieth Century: The Role of the Executive, in AFRICAN
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is, of course, not the sole function of the courts. It also requires a more
actively engaged monitorial citizenry.465  A respect-based philosophy
encourages citizen-monitoring of the police by open access to the press, a
willing embrace of outside auditors, acquiescence in defense discovery
requests, and creative modifications of civilian review boards. 66
Fifth, because a respect-based jurisprudence is very concerned with
current social practices and attitudes, it makes far more extensive use of
social science than is true today. Such social science is not always decisive,
but it is frequently relevant.467 Social science could enlighten efforts to
understand minority versus majority group experiences, inform judgments
about which governmental branches can best function in their own
particular ways, and reveal likely or unexpected effects of police actions. 68
AMERICANS AND THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 117-43 (John Hope Franklin & Genna Rae
McNeil eds., 1995) [hereinafter LIVING CONSTITUTION]; Gary Orfield, Congress and Civil
Rights, in LIVING CONSTITUTION, supra, at 144-80 (analyzing some of the forces determining
when Congress can, and sometimes has, served as the institution best able to protect civil
rights). See generally JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE'S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS,
CITIZENS, AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS OF RIGHTS (1998) (arguing that legislatures perform
commendably in protecting individual rights under certain circumstances).
464 See MICHAEL A. BAMBERGER, RECKLESS LEGISLATION: How LAWMAKERS IGNORE THE
CONSTITUTION (2000) (seeking to spark effort to remind lawmakers of their obligations to
serve the Constitution, especially given their unique institutional competencies).
465 See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147 (providing historical and textual support
for this proposition). Accord Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1120
(2000).
A transparent approach to government [search and seizure policy] does not envision citizens as
mere depositories of information; they should be directly involved in the formation and
reformulation of these decisions. Empowering citizens through access to government
information and by giving them a voice in the decisionmaking process is not only more
democratic, but has the potential to establish a basis for trust in otherwise distrusting
communities.
Id.
466 See Luna, supra note 465, at 1167-94 (describing more open and local community
review boards, videotaping of police-citizen interactions, public police administrative rule-
making, mandatory recordkeeping, and crime-mapping as tools to promote transparent
policing); Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 45 (valuing outside auditors as a restraint on
abusive searches and seizures); Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147, at 761-79 (arguing
that open discovery made available to the defense of material relevant to search and seizure
issues aids the citizenry's monitorial function).
467 See generally David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding":
Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541
(1991) (discussing advantages of, and methods for, using social science in creating and
applying constitutional rules).
468 See supra note 62 (describing majority versus minority group experiences and
attitudes); Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1 (illustrating
relevance of such experiences to Fourth Amendment case law); MICHAEL ToNRY, MALIGN
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At times, reliance on social science would readily alter results, as Justice
Stevens argued in his recent dissent in Illinois v. Wardlow.469 There, Justice
Stevens concluded, empirical data suggested that African American males
fleeing from the police in a high crime neighborhood were more likely to do
so from fear of the police rather than as recognition of guilt. Accordingly,
contrary to the majority's holding, Stevens would have found no reasonable
suspicion where a Terry stop was based solely on a suspect's flight in a
crime-ridden community.
Nor does it matter that there may be a dearth of social science evidence
on some questions. Decision makers should use the best science availabie,
and how widely we define "science" can affect the perceived supply of
relevant studies. 7°
Additionally, a respect-based jurisprudence involves the Court in
history more deeply than is now the case. As noted earlier, the history of
slavery and Reconstruction, not merely of the 1791 ratification of the Bill of
Rights, becomes critical.471 That history supports the emphasis on respect,
sheds light on some specific issues, identifies paradigm cases, and aids in
balancing.472 But understanding the evolving nature of our commitments
and the ways in which, and reasons for, our failures to meet them requires
immersion in more modem history as well. The Japanese-American
internment is once again a primary example, thus becoming relevant to
understanding modem racial profiling of Hispanic and African Americans.
In particular, the study of the internment reveals the critical social functions
of freedom of movement, helping to combat minimization of this value in
NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 104-07 (1995) (arguing that
disparate racial impact of the War on Drugs was foreseeable, partly because of awareness
that "relatively more drug arrests are made in minority communities than elsewhere ...
[because] they are easier to make," the result being that "police emphasis on disorganized
minority neighborhoods produce[d] racial proportions in arrests that do not mirror racial
proportions in drug use"); Tracey L. Meares & Bernard Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent
Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 733 (2000) (providing defense of, and guidance for, using social science
to inform search and seizure policy).
469 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2297-2300
(analyzing Stevens's dissent).
470 See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 258, at 743-58 (defending relevance of even
a single empirical study of Americans' privacy expectations to Fourth Amendment
decisionmaking); Meares & Harcourt, supra note 468.
471 See supra text accompanying notes 142-6 1.
472 See Taslitz, Slaves No More!, supra note 147 (illustrating using that history to resolve
a very specific issue); RUBENFELD, supra note 313, at 178-95 (arguing that history reveals
paradigm cases to identify core constitutional commitments).
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reasonableness balancing. 473 The commitments of a people to respect its
members are meaningless if abstracted from relevant history.
Finally, although I have repeatedly talked about minority group
historical experiences and minority attitudes, many Fourth Amendment
questions will not turn on issues of race. Nevertheless, the experiences of
the most vulnerable among us can help to inform judgments about whether
search and seizure practices that burden all equally adequately demonstrate
respect for human value. Moreover, the history of African Americans led to
the Fourteenth Amendment and thus is important to whites as well as to
racial and ethnic minorities.474  In any event, the value of respect is
important to all and is a too-often-neglected Fourth Amendment value, as
the analysis of the arrest of the driver who did not wear her seatbelt in the
Atwater case, discussed earlier in this article, illustrates.475 Respect is, of
course, not the only value that the Fourth Amendment serves. Furthermore,
sometimes there are respect-based injuries no matter what choice we
make.476  Additionally, an increased scope of Fourth Amendment
protections can be financially costly. 477 A respect-based approach does not,
therefore, promise mechanical solutions to constitutional problems. But it
does hold out the hope of more careful, fully informed decisions aspiring to
the best of American ideals.
VI. CONCLUSION
That all persons deserve equal respect is a largely unchallenged
assumption of the American political and legal systems.478 Yet, curiously,
the United States Supreme Court has never clearly defined the concept nor
adequately explored its implications in the highly emotionally-charged
setting of police searches and seizures of criminal suspects, where the
mandate to treat others with respect is sorely needed.
473 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2300-14
(recounting the internment process and its relevance to modem racial profiling).
474 See supra text accompanying notes 142-61.
475 See supra text accompanying notes 95-14 1.
476 See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 1, at 2327-54
(discussing Elian Gonzales).
177 See generally STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999) (demonstrating that all rights entail financial costs).
478 See generally Taslitz, Civil Society, supra note 86 (analyzing role of respect in
American culture in resolving issues raised by group-subordinating speech). Cf CHARLES
W. ANDERSON, A DEEPER FREEDOM: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AS AN EVERYDAY MORALITY
(2002) (addressing alternative theories of freedom but concluding that any sound theory
must recognize the uniqueness and infinite worth of every individual as well as his social
nature).
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This article has sought to fill this gap, defining "respect" as treating
others fittingly, that is, as equal status members of a common political
community. Unfitting "treatment" is an objective question of the plausible
meaning that may fairly be assigned to particular police action. A sound
political morality, this article has argued, requires recognizing that
individual identity is partly rooted in group identity and that groups often
differ, on average, in their perceptions of police behavior. Equality norms
suggest, furthermore, that the views of groups most likely to be vulnerable
to abusive search and seizure practices deserve the most attention.
Accordingly, inquiring into and comparing minority and majority
community attitudes about particular police practices can inform our
judgments about whether police treatment of suspects should plausibly be
understood as carrying an insulting social meaning. Apart from informing
that judgment, if certain groups subjectively experience a sense of
disrespect, however unfairly, that is a social cost that we should seek to
minimize whenever possible. A respect-based jurisprudence thus warmly
embraces social science studies on community attitudes toward the police
and toward justice, as well as on the likely impact of police policy choices.
Yet, where group attitudes indeed differ, the choice of which group's
views to honor is necessarily a value-laden one. A search for the
controlling values can be guided by taking seriously the Fourth
Amendment's declaration that it recognizes the right of "the People" to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 479  "Peoplehood" is best
understood as a common narrative about the changing nature of a political
community over time. That requires heeding the lessons to be learned from
search and seizure practices throughout, and including modem, American
history rather than turning solely to the history of the 1791 framers of the
Bill of Rights. Indeed, because the Fourth Amendment applies to the states
via the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment, the history surrounding ratification of
the latter amendment-including search and seizure practices under slavery
and Reconstruction-is important in giving the Fourth Amendment
meaning. That history itself offers support for a respect-based
jurisprudence, as defined here, as well as offering guidance regarding how
to make such a jurisprudence concrete in individual cases.
The study of current social practices and the wider sweep of American
history matters even when majority and minority attitudes coincide. Such
study reminds us of the dangers of state-enforced disrespect that history and
social science reveal can afflict even members of the racial majority.
Studying both history and current social practices helps to protect
479 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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individuals' expectations concerning proper treatment by the state, to
heighten the People's sense of political morality, and to alert us to the costs
of risking an overweening state. At the same time, when group attitudes do
indeed differ and there are sound reasons to favor the minority, political
common sense, equality norms, and substantive Fourth Amendment
aspirations require providing to the majority the same degree of protection
480that is accorded to the more vulnerable minority.
If respect requires attention to group norms, it also requires the
seemingly inconsistent honoring of the uniqueness of every individual, thus
discouraging reliance on group-based stereotypes in determining whether
individualized probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists. The apparent
inconsistency is better described as a tension between individualized and
group justice. But that tension can be resolved, for example, by
demonstrating that young African American males are victims of racial
profiling (violating the aspiration to judge others based on their individual
capacities and commitments rather than on their membership in a group)
and that African American males, on average, are more likely as a group to
flee from the police.48'
Respect also requires salient groups to have a voice in police
decisionmaking processes, decisions that must be based on substantial and
likely accurate evidence of individual wrongdoing, and on recognition of
the shared institutional Fourth Amendments obligations of all three
branches of government. 482 The totality of these principles of a respect-
based jurisprudence will lead to more informed judgments than, and often
different results from, what is the situation under current case law. A
respect-full jurisprudence would alter the inferences made at suppression
fact-finding hearings, explore racially discriminatory motives and impact,
consider the broader costs of law enforcement to social sub-groups and to
society rather than only to the individual suspect, and encourage courts to
craft rules giving the executive and legislative branches incentives to
address problems that the courts are ill-equipped to challenge. These
consequences would likely alter current law by making both intentional and
subconscious racial profiling into Fourth Amendment concerns, reducing
the number of instances in which reasonable suspicion to stop suspects can
be shown upon skimpy evidence of doubtful accuracy, bringing Fourth
Amendment case law closer to ordinary citizens' expectations, and
480 See supra Part II.B.
481 See supra Part III.
482 See generally Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note I
(illustrating the group-individualized justice tension in four infamous search and seizure
episodes in twentieth-century American history).
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expanding the role of the press and of independent groups in monitoring the
police. In short, a respect-based jurisprudence would matter by promoting
social unity, citizen voice, and police accountability, bringing the American
people closer to making real the promise of treating all persons as being
"created equal, 'AS3 the animating promise behind the creation and
flourishing of our nation.
483 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
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